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1. INTRODUCrION
The United States of America and Germany represent twvo
powerful economies and influential legal systems. Their
economies are linked in the dynamics of international trade, and
their constitutions share in the wide culture of Western
constitutional thought. In light of these facts, the direct
relationships between these big trade partners in matters of
business and law are always of great importance, in both the
practical and the scholarly view. Of course, the influence of
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American corporate law and its financial innovations on German
law and capital markets is much greater than it is vice versa, and
American visions serve as models for other jurisdictions more than
the visions of other jurisdictions. However, even this observation
is an understatement. Delaware, the most important corporate law
jurisdiction in the United States,' is so flexible, resourceful, and
rich in ideas, that it might be both difficult and challenging for
European continental lawyers to explore or create similar rules and
to institute them in their civil legal systems.
In recent decades, American corporations have embraced many
new and unique ways of structuring their capital and undertaking
corporate transactions. In this context, among the group of
innovations that demonstrate the flexibility of American corporate
law, tracking stock plays an outstanding role.2 Debt, preferred
stock, and common stock represent the typical capital structure of a
corporation. Tracking stock is thereby a class or series of common
stock of that corporation. Each class is designed to track the
operating and financial performance of a distinct business
segment, subsidiary or revenue stream of that corporation. The
outstanding common stock of such a corporation is typically
redesigned as one class of tracking stock linked to the corporation's
remaining or better core business; whereas the new class of
tracking stock is linked to this "tracked" segment, division or
group by means of separate financial reporting. The different
classes of tracking stock are then listed or quoted individually and
are traded separately. From the market perspective, this means
that tracking stock and the company's other stock each have their
own trading symbols and often are followed by separate groups of
analysts, depending upon the industry.
I Because almost all tracking stock corporations in existence today are
Delaware corporations, Delaware corporate law will be construed and applied
throughout this Article exclusively regarding corporate law issues in the
American jurisdiction. For a comprehensive overview on Delaware corporate law
and some issues of its developments, see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997).
2 Tracking stocks are also known as alphabet stocks, lettered stocks or
targeted stocks. The reasons therefore are discussed by, for example, Jeffrey J.
Hass, Directorial Fiduciary Duties in a Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The Need for a
Duty of Fairness, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2089, 2090 n.3 (1996) (explaining the origin of
tracking stocks' various names).
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Structuring a tracking stock culture, however, does not lead to
the formation of separate entities. Tracking stock remains the
equity of the parent corporation and holders of tracking stock
continue to be, or become, shareholders of the whole corporation
and not of the tracked business segment (whereas in carve-outs
and spin-offs, conversely, the subsidiary's assets are transferred to
a new company). Accordingly, preferred stockholders as well as
general and secured creditors of the parent corporation, are
basically unaffected by the implementation of a tracking stock
culture because all assets of the corporation remain available to
satisfy all liabilities.3 Regardless of how the firm organizes the
structure of issued stock and conducts its accounting and financial
reporting system, the subject of private liability always will be the
same. In sum, it is not the relationships between the shareholders
on the one hand and the corporation and its creditors on the other
that are affected, but mainly the relationship between the owners
of tracking stock and owners of the residual class of common stock.
In Germany, publicly held corporations still do not issue a
financial tool like tracking stock. Of course, the implementation of
a tracking stock culture is often discussed among investment banks
and law firms. Many companies are now attempting to broaden
their shareholder base, and the creation of "shareholder value" has
become a goal of some larger German companies. However, until
now no German company has faced the challenges and
opportunities of tracking stock in praxis. What are the reasons for
this? German reluctance regarding American financial
innovations? A legal system that is not established and prepared
for new ways to finance a company and to enhance shareholder
value? Indeed, it is often argued that the inefficiency and
inflexibility of German corporate law is responsible for the
nonexistence of tracking stock. Only the shares of the nominal
capital of a stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) may be quoted on
stock exchanges, but never, so some might guess, can "virtual"
shares linked to the performance of a particular business unit be so
quoted. In Germany, the effect of tracking stock could only be
reached by equity carve-outs or spin-offs.
3 Of course, to be more precise, when the preferred stockholders have
conversion rights, they can potentially be affected.
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Regarding tracking stock, this Article scrutinizes whether
German corporate law is indeed unable to adopt this American
financial innovation or if it at least allows the creation of something
equivalent to tracking stock. This analysis will lead to the
conclusion that Germany is basically prepared to implement a
tracking stock culture and, however, problems will arise in the
details of the structure. Moreover, the comparison between the
outcomes under American law on the one hand and German law
on the other shows that the main issues and their legal handling in
both jurisdictions widely correspond. Following this introduction,
Section 2 of the Article briefly describes the development of
tracking stock in the United States. Section 3 discusses the
reasoning for issuing tracking stock and why Wall Street financial
engineers are still busy improving this financial tool. A key point
here, among others, is to explain the rationale behind the use of,
and how capital markets evaluate, tracking stock. Section 4 deals
with tracking stock under American law. Here the reader should
get a general understanding of the structure of, and some legal
issues relating to, this hybrid form of common stock in order to
prepare herself or himself for the approach of the German civil law
jurisdiction. Therefore, the goal of this part is only to create an
awareness of general legal issues, and not to scrutinize problems
under American law and lead them to a satisfying solution. This
limitation also means that subjects under the American Securities
Act of 1933 or under the Exchange Act of 1934 are not focused
upon at all and tax issues will only be dealt with briefly. Section 5,
as the main content of the Article, articulates the unique legal
challenges to structuring and implementing a tracking stock
culture under German corporate law. There are some complex
topics to consider, many of which have little or no precedent in
German experience. Hence, the focus on corporate law is
necessary and indicates here as well that issues of securities
regulations, accounting, and taxes are not addressed. Section 6
closes the investigation with a summary and a forecast.
2. EVOLUTION OF TiE TRACKING STOCK CULTURE
IN THE UNITED STATES
The development of tracking stock is derived from the
tendency to diversify business activities of an enterprise.
Diversification in this context means to run a business with two or
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more unrelated product lines. Even when there are no historical
reasons for diversification, corporations almost always strive for
diversification to minimize the risks of a downturn with just one
product line (in the worst case insolvency) and to maximize the
effects of synergies. Even with diversified activities, however, the
holders of the outstanding shares collectively own the entire
ownership interest in the corporation. To the extent that the
corporation as a whole performs well, the price of shares and the
payment of dividends reflect this outcome regardless of how any
particular segment of that corporation performs. Whereas under
this construction usually only one single class of common stock
exists, a corporation with a tracking stock culture has shares of at
least two separate and distinct classes of common stock
outstanding. Yet, each class of common stock of a tracking stock
corporation gives the basis to "track" or "target" the financial
performance of a distinct business segment or group 4
During the past decade in the United States, tracking stock has
converted from an obscure, unknown, and little-understood
corporate finance tool into one that is commonly accepted,
although still debated. For quite a long time, issues regarding
tracking stock solely have been a matter of practical interest for
Wall Street law firms and investment banks. Only lately has the
legal scholarly interest caught up and started to accompany the
exploding development of tracking stock. Whereas initially mainly
articles in handbooks were published s more and more scholars are
4 According to the terminology of Hass, supra note 2, at 2095.
5 See Dickson G. Brown & Karen S. Handler, Tracking Stock, in TAX STRATEGIES
FOR CORPORATE AcQuISrIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCrURINGS 2000, at 119 (PLI Tax Law and
Estate Planning Course, Handbook Series No. J0-002R, 2000) [hereinafter Brown &
Handler, Tracking Stock] (analyzing tax issues in connection with tracking stock);
James L. Dahlberg & Jay D. Perry, Tracking Stock- Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities,
and Virtual Mergers and Acquisitions, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE
AcQUISTONS, DIsPOsIIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS,
REORGANIZATIONS & REsTRucTuRINGS 2000, at 241 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planing
Course, Handbook Series No. J0-002R, 2000) [hereinafter Dahlberg & Perry,
Tracking Stock. Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual Mergers and Acqpisitions]
(assessing the use of tracking stock in comparison to other structures); Stuart
Finkelstein et al., Tracking Tracking Stock, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPO, ATE
ACQUISmONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JoiNT VENTURES, FiNANCINcs,
REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 2000, at 169 (PLI Tax Law and Estate
Planning Course, Handbook Series No. J0-002R, 2000) [hereinafter Finkelstein et
al., Tracking Tracking Stock] (analyzing the employment of tracking stock); Erica H.
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beginning to scrutinize the financial6 and legal7 problems of
tracking stock in highly recognized journals and books. The reason
is obvious; a number of prominent U.S. companies have
undertaken to operate their business using an evolutionary
corporate equity structure that employs a tracking stock culture-
and more and more firms must consider catching up with this
development.
Steinberger & Jeffrey J. Hass, Introduction to Tracking Stocks, in ACQUISITIONS,
MERGERS, SPIN-OFFs, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURINGS 1993, at 523 (PLI Corporate Law
& Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 825, 1993) [hereinafter Steinberger &
Hass, Introduction to Tracking Stocks] (providing an early explanation of tracking
stock); Bruce N. Hawthorne, Tracking Stock: Terms, Methods of Issuance, Advantages
and Disadvantages 2000, at 47 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. 1213, 2000) [hereinafter Hawthorne, Tracking Stock: Terms, Methods of
Issuance, Advantages and Disadvantages] (explaining the basic treatment of tracking
stock); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Patricia A. O'Neill, Merger Issues at the New
Millennium: Strategic Deals, Tracking Stocks and the Duty to be Informed 2000, at 179
(PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1158, 2000)
[hereinafter Sparks & O'Neill, Merger Issues at the New Millennium: Strategic Deals,
Tracking Stocks and the Duty be Informed] (analyzing the application of the business
judgment rule in the tracking stock context); see also Michael Kliegman, Corporate
Restructuring & Spin-Offs, 1 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L. F. 35 (1996) (dealing with
tax issues); Michael A. Pittenger et al., Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate
Law, 3 DEL. L. REV. 107 (2000) (analyzing a recent tracking stock case).
6 See, e.g., Patricia L. Anslinger et al., Breaking Up Is Good To Do, 1 THE
MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 16-27 (1999) (examining the performance of tracking stock
and explaining the reasons for tracking stock); Julia D'Souza & John Jacob, 'Why
Firms Issue Targeted Stock, 56 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 459-83 (1999), available at
http://www.elsevier.nl:80/cas/tree/store/finec/sub/2000/56/3/1072.pdf/
(examining the performance of tracking stock and explaining the reasons
therefor); Dennis E. Logue et al., Rearranging Residual Claims: A Case for Targeted
Stock, 25 FIN. MGMT. 43 (1996) (examining share price reactions of companies
announcing a tracking stock and comparing various equity reorganization forms);
Ingo Natusch, Non-Tax Motivations for Tracking Stock, 8 THE M&A TAX REP. 1, 1-3
(No. 6 2000) (explaining the use of tracking stock beyond tax considerations);
Thomas J. Chemmanur & Imants Paeglis, Why Issue Tracking Stock? Insights from a
Comparison with Spin-offs and Carve-outs, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=250522 (Working Paper, 2000) (studying the effects of
tracking stock versus spin-offs and carve-outs);.
7 See Charles A. Borek, Corporate Taxation's Square Peg: An Analysis of Possible
Solutions to the Problem of Characterizing "Tracking Stock"for Tax Purposes, 43 CATH.
U. L. REv. 1107 (1994); Ajay Gupta, Tracking Stranded Costs, 21 ENERGY L. J. 113
(2000); Hass, supra note 2, at 2089; Jeffrey J. Schick, Notes & Comments: Toward
Transaction-Specific Standards of Directorial Fiduciary Duty in the Tracking-Stock
Context, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1365 (2000). For an excellent discussion of American
law issues in German, see SANDRA THIEL, SPARTENAKTIEN FOR DEUTSCHE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFrEN (2001) [hereinafter THIEL, SPARTENAKTIEN].
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The first well-documented use of tracking stock was General
Motors Corporation's ("GM") introduction of an independently
traded stock for Electronic Data Systems ("EDS"), in conjunction
with GM's acquisition of EDS in 1984.8 Industry Tycoon Ross
Perot, the previous owner of EDS, had expressed concern that the
performance of EDS managers would have little impact on
undivided GM stock. The introduction of a separate tracking stock
for EDS helped to convince Ross Perot to sell the firm. The same
mechanism to create a special merger currency was used by the
firm just one year later when it bought Hughes Aircraft in 1985.9
Because this first generation of tracking stock was designed to track
the operating and financial performance of a subsidiary as a legal
entity (e.g., EDS or Hughes Aircraft), these tracked stocks were
also named "subsidiary shares." The term "alphabet stock" is
derived from GM's creation of "E" and "H" stock to track its
subsidiaries, EDS and Hughes Aircraft
The so named second generation of tracking stock was created
for the first time by USX Corporation in May 1991.10 The issuance
of USX tracking stock differed from the stock issued by GM
because the latter stock was linked to certain divisions (U.S. Steel
and Marathon Oil) instead of to a subsidiary. U.S. Steel and
Marathon Oil operated in widely different industries and it
appeared that USX's undivided stock was undervalued by the
market As a major stockholder demanded that the company spin
off its steel division to enhance shareholder value, the company
decided to issue tracking stock for its steel and oil division and
thus created the first "divisional shares." Shortly thereafter, in
September 1992, USX created a third tracking stock when it sold
shares of USX Delhi Group Stock in an IPO.n
The process of issuing tracking stock does not stop there.
Rather, on April 26, 2000, AT&T raised roughly $10.6 billion in a
public offering of a new class of tracking stock designed to track
AT&T's wireless group services business. At that time, the AT&T
s See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., PROXY STATEMiENT/PRosPECIrUS (Sept. 21,1934)
[hereinafter GM-EDS PROXY STATEMENT].
9 See GENERAL MOTORS CORP., SOLICITATION STATEMENT (Nov. 13, 19S-).
10 USX CORP., PROXY STATENENT AND PROSPECTUS (Apr. 10, 1991) [hereinafter
USX-MARATHON PROXY STATEMENT].
1 See USX CORP., PROXY STAIEMENT (Apr. 13, 1992) [hereinafter USX-DaIn
PROXY STATEMENT].
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offering ranked as the largest U.S. initial offering in history.12 In
sum, there are currently in excess of twenty different tracking
stocks outstanding in the United States. Even outside the United
States, more and more firms contemplate implementing a tracking
stock culture. Fletcher Challenge Ltd. of New Zealand introduced
a tracking stock for its forest division in 1992.13 The firm issued
three more tracking stocks for its paper, building, and energy
divisions in 1996. The French company Alcatel was the first
European company to sell tracking shares, following U.S.
companies such as Sprint. Alcatel raised $1.2 billion in October
2000 from selling shares in its optical parts unit, which it priced at
the low end of the range because of declines in technology stocks.
The high-tech company sold 16.5 million new shares that track the
performance of Optronics, Europe's top maker of lasers, filters, and
parts that boost a fiber-optic network's capacity. The shares are
trading in Paris on the Premier March6 under the symbol CGO and
as American Depository Receipts (ADRs)14 on the NASDAQ under
the ticker ALAO.
12 Dahlberg & Perry, Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual
Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 5, at 245.
13 See FLETCHER CHALLENGE LTD., SOLICITATION STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUS
(Oct. 21,1993) [hereinafter FLETCHER SOUITATION STATEMENT].
14 American depository receipts are designed to further facilitate the bringing
of foreign stock closer to investors. They represent a certain number of foreign
shares on deposit with a U.S. bank or a custodian bank in the foreign country. The
U.S. bank acts as a transfer agent for investors and receives dividends, pays taxes,
converts all amounts into dollars, and distributes the money to shareholders.
ADRs established-especially for German companies-the major way to
American capital markets. For more information on ADRs and international
securities transactions, see Michael Gruson, Global Shares of German Corporations
and Their Dual Listings on the Frankfurt and New York Stock Exchanges, 22 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 185 (2001) (discussing ADRs and international securities
transactions); Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in
International Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 51 (2000) (arguing
that regulatory concern should address potential opportunistic behavior of
corporate managers in international securities transactions).
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Table 1: Samples of Highly Recognized Tracking Stock Issuances
Company Stock Trading Main Year
Symbol Exchange
General Hughes GMH NYSE 1985
Motors
USX Steel Group X NYSE 1991
Marathon Group MRO 1991
Pittston Minerals PZM NYSE 1993
Brinks PZB 1996
Bax PZX 1996
Fletcher Forests Division FFS NZSE 1993
Challenge Paper Division FLP 1996
Building Division FLB 1996
Energy Division FEG 1996
Genzyme General Division GENZ NASDAQ 1994
Tissue Repair GZTR N-Mkt 1994
Molecular Oncology GZMO 1998
Surgical Products GZSP 1999
CMS CMS Energy CMS NYSE 1995
Energy Consumers Gas CPG 1994
INCO INCO Ltd. Common N TSE 1996
Shares 1996
INCO Ltd. Class N/V
VBN Shares
Georgia Georgia Pacific GP NYSE 1997
Pacific Group 1997
Timber Group TGP
Sprint Sprint FON Group FON NYSE 1998
Sprint PCS Group PCs 1998
Conectiv Conectiv Common CIV NYSE 1998
Stock 1998
Conectiv Class A CIV/A
Common Stock
AT&T Liberty Media LBTYA/B NYSE 1998
Perkin Celera Genomics CRA NYSE 1998
in den Handel bringen,is Aktien fiar Geschzftsbereiche sollen mehr Sdrnoung
HANDELSBLATrFINANZZEITuNG, Apr. 4,1999, No. 69, at 45.
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Company Stock Trading Main Year
Symbol Exchange
Elmer PE Biosystems PEB 1998
Ziff-Davis ZD Stock ZD NYSE 1999
ZD-Net Stock ZDZ 1999
DLJ-Direct DLJ Common Stock DLJ NYSE 1999
DLJ-Direct Common 1999
Stock DIR
Quantum Hard Disk Drive HDD NYSE 1999
Group 1999
DLT & Storage DSS
Systems Group
Walt Walt Disney DIS NYSE 1999
Disney Common Stock 1999
Go.com Common GO
Stock
Snyder SNC Common Stock SNC NASDAQ 1999
Commun- Circle.com Common N-Mkt 1999
ications Stock CIRC
ASX = American Stock Exchange, MSE = Montrdal Stock
Exchange, NASDAQ = National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation System, NYSE = New York Stock Exchange,
NZSE = New Zealand Stock Exchange, TSE = Toronto Stock
Exchange.
3. REASONING FOR ESTABLISHING A TRACKING STOCK CULTURE
Corporations have implemented the tracking stock culture for a
number of reasons. To enhance the shareholder value and to
provide a unique type of consideration in the context of Mergers &
Acquisitions ("M&A") are deemed to be the primary reasons.16
Although these aspects are very crucial, other points and serious
disadvantages have to be taken into account. As a matter of basic
principle, issuance of tracking stock is, speaking in corporate
finance terms, a capital structure decision.17  As a lawyer,
understanding how capital structure can increase or decrease value
16 Hass, supra note 2, at 2099-2107.
17 Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and
Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 175,187 (2000).
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is important in estimating how to structure transactions to take
maximum advantage of those opportunities without violating the
law.'8
3.1. Enhancement of Sharelwlder Value
3.1.1. The General Idea
Tracking stocks are chiefly launched to unlock hidden
shareholder value 9 They are employed to enable the market to
value more accurately the respective businesses of the issuer
without complete economic separation. The financial engineering
idea behind tracking stock is that the company's currently
outstanding common stock is undervalued because such stock has
been linked too closely to the performance of the entire business
rather than to the performance of a particular, probably more
attractive, division of the whole corporation (conglomerate discount).
A similar situation exists if a firm has different investment projects
available, but some are hard to value for investors. In all cases
Is Regarding capital structure like tracking stock, see id. at 187-88, 191-92. See
generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984) (explaining how business lawyers can increase
transaction value).
19 See, e.g., Kenneth N. Gilpin, Shares That Track Assets Add Value at a Cost,
N.Y. TMS, July 18, 1999, § 3 at 7 (arguing that companies have issued tracking
stock to increase shareholder value); Adam Lashinsky, Will The Boon in Trading
Stocks Derail Investors?, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 210-12 (arguing that companies
use tracking stocks to boost their share price); Arthur M. Louis, Tracking Stock Can
Unleash a Unit's Value, S.F. CHRoN., May 11, 1999, at Cl (explaining that tracking
stocks are designed to unleash the market potential of promising subsidiaries);
Making Tracks, EcoONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1999, at 79 (explaining that many tracking
stocks aim at unlocking value trapped in profitable subsidiaries); Steven Syre &
Charles Stein, Genzyme Tracking Stocks Are Off Track on Retuns, BOSTON GLOBS,
June 24,1999, at D1 (arguing that large companies create tracking stocks to unlock
market value of a small unit); Marcia Vickers, Are Two Stocks Better Than One?,
Bus. WK., June 28, 1999, at 98-99 (explaining that companies issue tracking stock
believing that tracking stock and the parent company's stock will be worth more
than a single company stock); Chemmanur & Paeglis, supra note 6, at 7-9
(describing various potential motivating factors for issuing tracking stocks). For
the statements of the issuers, see also RALSTON PURINA Co., PROXY STATEMIENT AND
PROSPECTUS, at 28,29 (une 9,1993) [hereinafter RALSTON PROXY STATE,%MNT]; TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., PROXY STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUS, at 49 (une 28, 1995)
[hereinafter TCI PRoXY STATEMENT]; US WEST, INC., PROXY STATFINT AND
PROSPECTUS, at 40 (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter US WEST PROXY STATMIeN];
FLETCHER SOLICITATION STATEMNT, supra note 13, at 23.
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investors are likely to discount the hard-to-value projects
significantly because of the problems caused by asymmetric
information.20 In other words, capital markets are not efficient
enough in valuing these stocks. USX Corporation, for instance, has
implemented its tracking stock structure in order to unlock hidden
shareholder value.21
This assumption might more or less meet the market situation;
however, in any case, tracking stocks separately offer shareholders
the opportunity to evaluate and either retain or sell the securities
depending on their personal investment objectives. 22 The goal in
implementing a tracking stock culture is to provide more
transparency and to create a fiction in the investment community.
Tracking stock corporations and their advisors hope that shares of
each class will trade in the financial marketplace based directly on
how the tracked business segment performs and only indirectly, if
at all, on the performance of the corporation as a whole (quasi pure
equity play).23 The possibility of evaluating a company under
different investment objectives has some positive side effects.24
First, there is an increase in coverage by analysts. Additionally, the
restructured company attracts new investors.
3.1.2. Some Empirical Statements on Shareholder Value and
Tracking Stock
The prevailing financial press and academics are pessimistic
regarding the issuance of tracking stock.25 Some commentators
20 Huang & Knoll, supra note 17, at 188; Chemmanur & Paeglis, supra note 6,
at 7-8.
21 USX-DEUUH PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 11, at 11.
22 Steinberger & Hass, supra note 5, at 527.
23 See Hass, supra note 2, at 2096, 2107 (explaining that corporations
implementing tracking stock cultures will assess shares of each class as shares of a
stand-alone corporation).
24 See, e.g., Anslinger et al., supra note 6, at 18-23 (providing a broader
description of side effects); Chemmanur & Paeglis, supra note 6, at 8 (listing
reasons for the possible increase in coverage by analysts).
25 See, e.g., Susan Pulliam & Steven Lipin, Target Stock is Under Fire from
Investors, WALL ST. J., April 11, 1995, at Cl (noting that some studies have
concluded that tracking stocks do not perform as well as complete spinoffs);
Jennifer Reingold, Targeted Stock is the Flavor of the Month in Corporate America. It
Won't Taste Good to Everyone, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 26, 1995, at 32-33 (explaining the
numerous downsides of tracking stock); Stephanie Strom, It's Called Target Stock;
Shun it, Some Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at D1 (arguing that tracking
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speculate that tracking stocks trade at a discount of as much as five
to ten percent when compared to their peers. Prominent scholars
even say that it "is absolutely the purest form of financial
engineering, and it yields no benefit at all"26 However, some
tracking stocks, such as Sprint PCS, have performed quite well,
and proponents argue that issuing tracking stock has very real
advantages over having a single stock for a conglomerate or
spinning off of divisions 27
Recent comprehensive investigations support this estimation.
Souza and Jacob have attempted to present empirical evidence to
shed some light on the debate regarding whether the issuance of
tracking stock is accompanied by an increase in equity value. They
find a statistically significant positive market reaction through an
abnormal return of 3.61% within a three-day window around the
announcement of proposed tracking stock issuances (announcement
effect). They conclude that the market appears to regard the
issuance of tracking stock as good news. This increase in value
could stem from the availability of more detailed information on
each tracking stock segment, as well as from the monitoring and
motivational advantages of having a stock directly linked with the
industry segment However, they limit their results insofar as
tracking stocks of the same firm do not trade independently of
each other. They figure that stock returns on tracking stock and
cash flows from operations of tracked segments seem to target
their firm more than their industry.28
These optimistic, but still unclear, results correspond mostly
with other comprehensive investigations. McKinsey & Company
stocks are suspect with many large shareholders and difficult for investors to
understand); Matthew T. Billet & Anand M. Vijh, 7he Market Performance of
Tracking Stocks 2 (Working Paper 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/delivery.cfm/000523307.pdf?abstract_id=229549 (last visited Oct. 13, 2001)
(finding that tracking stocks have negative returns).
26 Strom, supra note 25, at D1 (quoting Professor Bruce Greenwald of
Columbia University).
27 Anslinger et al, supra note 6, at 18-23; Logue et aL, supra note 6, at 43-61;
D'Souza & Jacob, supra note 6, at 7-9. But cf. Chemmanur & Paeglis, supra note 6,
at 28-29 (finding that tracking stocks underperform in the long run). See also the
first German investigation in INGO NATUScH, TRACKING STOCK ALS INSr-RMENT DER
BETE1IGUNGSFINANZIERUNG DIVERSIFIZIERTER UNTERNEHMEN (2 r d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter NATUSCH, TRAcKNTG STOCK ALS INSTRUMENT DER BEriucuzcs-
FINANZIERUNG DIVERSIFIZIERTER UNTERNEHMEN].
2s D'Souza & Jacob, supra note 6, at 11, 24-25.
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studied the performance of the large ownership restructurings-
those in which the parent company had revenues upward of $200
million at the time of divestiture-that took place in the United
States from 1988 to 1998.29 Their research shows that the
announcement of tracking-stock deals or spin-offs tends to raise
the price of the parent company's stock by two to three percent.
Regarding recent announcements of majority-owned equity carve-
outs, however, they found no positive effect on the parent
company's stock. In the longer term, equity carve-outs in which
the parent company retains majority ownership easily
outperformed the Russell 2000 index, with an average annual
return of twenty-four percent as compared with eleven percent in
the two years after issue. McKinsey chose to concentrate on
majority-owned carve-outs, since they are more common than
those involving minority stakes. Spin-offs also substantially
outperform the market, showing a two-year annualized return of
twenty-seven percent, compared with fourteen percent for the
Russell 2000 and seventeen percent for the S&P 500. Large-cap
spin-offs actually lag the market. It is the spin-offs with lower
market capitalization-less than $1 billion-that account for this
performance. By contrast, tracking stocks tend to trail the market,
with a return of nineteen percent as compared with twenty-one
percent for the S&P 500. Yet benchmarked against industry peers,
they kept pace.
Although some researchers have found very positive trends
and studies have reported increases in stock values-especially
when stocks were previously discounted due to cross-industry
operations-tracking stock does not exist in adequate numbers to
generate a statistically valid sample. Too few tracking stock
deals-even outside the United States-have been done in the past
fifteen years to support any general conclusions. Among others, it
is still particularly undear whether the performance of tracking
stocks is related to their nature as tracking stock or the
characteristics of the issuers of these securities.
3.2. Tracking Stock in Mergers & Acquisitions Contexts
Many M&A deals involving tracking stock are financed with
the shares of the acquiring company for all or part of the
29 See Anslinger et al., supra note 6, at 19-20.
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consideration to the selling stockholder. 30 Two major reasons lead
to this structure. Raising consideration from own common stock is
first of all a formidable way to finance a deal instead of using cash.
In order to eliminate conflicts that arise when a minority equity
interest in the target remains outstanding, own stock as a deal
currency also offers the slarelwlders of thze target conpany the
opportunity to continue their participation in the expected future
performance of the acquired corporation and increases the
likelihood that the acquiring company will get all shares of the
target. However, in practice the negotiating sellers are often faced
with a huge conglomerate that is running various business lines
and is complexly structured. Yet, the threat is that the performance
of the former target will become extinct in the conglomerate and
will be unable to trace back. In particular, shareholders of a target
corporation with high earning potential may be unwilling to accept
regular common stock of an acquirer with only average earning
potential. Tracking stocks help to solve such conflicts and they are
often designed as a special acquisition currencyXl In order to
provide that this consideration in the form of common stock is still
linked to the performance of the target company after the deal, the
acquiring company creates a separate class of tracking stock.
Simultaneously the remaining outstanding common stock of the
acquiring company would be modified to track all other business
lines except the segment of the target.3 2 Eventually, the target
company may also negotiate for additional class voting rights,
30 See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 7, at 154-155 (arguing that tracking stock capital
may facilitate mergers); Allan Sloan, 4,zy AT&T Is Feeding Ducks, NwswE-IM_, Dec.
13, 1999, at 71 (noting that AT&T stock price went up, as a result of issuing
tracking stock, before it took over MediaOne).
31 The transaction between TCI and Viacom provides an example. Viacom
issued cable subsidiary common stock to its shareholders in a spin-off of this
subsidiary. Immediately following the acquisition by TCI of the cable subsidiary,
these common shares were converted automatically into preferred stock that is
exchangeable for TCI tracking stock five years after issuance. For further
examples, see Brown & Handler, Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 159-60.
32 See GENZYME CORP., PROSPECTUS AND JOINT PROxy STATEMENT (November
10, 1994), at 38 [hereinafter GENzYMtE PROXY STATEMENT] (describing Genzyme
Corporation's plan to create a new class of stock that will reflect the value and
track the performance of a new division to be established within the company);
GM-EDS PRoxY STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 19-21.
2001]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
which may be reflected in the charter or contained in the
acquisition agreements. 3
Thus, in comparison to regular stock as a financing
consideration for M&A deals, tracking stock allows former
shareholders of the target company to continue participation in
any equity appreciation associated with that company.3 4 The very
first introduction of tracking stock by GM is a vivid example of
that reasoning. Moreover, a tracking stock culture is more likely to
motivate the management of the target company to stay. This can
be reached when bonus and stock option plans are tied to the
performance of an equity security, reflecting the operating results
of their own management conduct rather than the business of the
whole merged business over which such managers naturally have
little or no influence. Eventually, tracking stock can be used as a
defensive measure.m
3.3. Tracking Stock as Employment Consideration
Not only in the context of M&A deals, but also in general
terms, firms enhance the use of tracking stock as a special
compensation for employees.36 A tracking stock culture improves
3 Hawthorne, Tracking Stock Terms, Methods of Issuance, Advantages, and
Disadvantages, supra note 5, at 52.
34 In addition, if the businesses are to any extent complementary, keeping
them together may be beneficial. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2100.
35 See THIEL, SPARTENAKTIEN, supra note 7, at 21-23; Theodor Baums,
Spartenorganisation, "Tracking Stock," und deutsches Aktienrecht, in VERANTWoRTUNG
UND GESTALTUNG, FESTscHRIFT FOR KARLHEINZ BOUJONG 21, 21 (Carsten Thomas
Ebenroth, Dieter Hesselberger & Manfred Eberhard Rinne eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Baums, Spartenorganisation, "Tracking Stock" und deutsches Aktienrecht]; Ingo
Natusch, Neue Wege der Beteiligungsfinanzierung deutscher Unternehmen durch die
Ausgabe von "Tracking Stocks?," 50 DER BETRIEB [DB] 1141, 1144 (1997) [hereinafter
Natusch, Neue Wege der Beteiligungsfinanzierung deutscher Unternehmen durch die
Ausgabe von "Tracking Stocks?"].
NL Industries provides an example of tracking stock used as a defensive
measure. In response to a tender offer from the Simmons Group, NL Industries
anticipated undertaking a spin-off of the wholly owned subsidiary, NL Chemical,
and issued Series C preferred stock, which tracked Chemicals' assets to NL
shareholders. For a closer description of this case, see THIEL, SPARTENAKTIEN,
supra note 7, at 22.
36 See, e.g., Peter Coy, Tracking Stocks Are Accidents Waiting to Happen, Bus.
WK., Aug. 22, 1999, at 33 (noting that managers can be rewarded with tracking
stock options, and that in particular, the Internet industry has spawned this use of
tracking stock to hire top talented employees).
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employee stock option plans and management incentive programs
by more closely aligning stock with the performance of a specific
business.37 Besides its function as employment consideration,
tracking stock provides a further feature. Tracking stock moves
managers in the position to act more as owners than as employees.
Hence, tracking stocks might create value by reducing agency
costs. 38
3.4. The Tax Issue: Whose Stock Is It?
Beyond the scope of this Article, but very often discussed
under the subject "tracking stock," are tax issues3 9 Because tax
matters are always important and sometimes even crucial for
structuring a corporation, they should be mentioned briefly. In
this connection, the major question is whether tracking stock will
be treated as stock of the parent corporation, stock of the tracked
subsidiary (in the case of subsidiary tracking stock), or stock of a
virtual entity holding the tracked assets (in the case of divisional
tracking stock). Section 1032(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
("LR.C.") provides that a corporation does not recognize gain or
loss on the receipt of property in exchange for its stock.4P In
contrast, if treated as stock of, let's say, a subsidiary, the issuing
corporation would not be protected by that provision and would
instead be required to recognize gain or loss at the time of an IPO.
Further, section 311(a)(1)41 and section 305(a)42 of the I.R.C. allow a
37 Gupta, supra note 7, at 155; Schick, supra note 7, at 1372-73.
3 Huang & Knoll, supra note 17, at 188; Manfred Steiner & Ingo Natusch,
Tracking stocks - Innovatives Instrument der Beteiligungsfinanzierung, 1996 DiE BANK
580,584 (1996).
39 See, e.g., THIEL, SPARTENAKTIEN, supra note 7, at 93-99; Borek, supra note 7, at
1107,1108 (discussing the uniqueness of tracking stock in its "vertical division of
corporate interests" and deliberating "whether it will be subject to various
corporate tax provisions"); Dahlberg & Perry, Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity,
Virtual Entities, and Virtual Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 5, at 255-95
(describing the vertical division of corporate interests provided by tracking stock);
Finkelstein et aL, Tracking Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 182-191 (explaining the
different consequences of treating tracking stock as parent stock or subsidiary
stock); Ingo Natusch, "Traxking Stocks": aus Sicht des US-Steuerrechts, 6
INrERNATIONALEs STEuERREcHT [IStR] 609 (1997) [hereinafter Natusch, "Traxking
Stocks": aus Sicht des US-Steuerrechts].
40 I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1994).
41 Id. § 311(a)(1).
42Id. § 305(a).
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corporation to distribute its own stock to its shareholders without
incurring tax liability to both the issuer and its shareholders. If
tracking stock is stated to be something other than the stock of the
parent corporation, however, the distribution would be taxable to
the shareholders under section 30143 of the I.R.C., and the issuing
corporation would be required to recognize gains pursuant to
I.R.C. § 311(b),44 unless the distribution qualified as a tax-free
distribution under I.R.C. § 355.45 Corresponding problems arise in
the context of the use of tracking stock as M&A currency (in a
forward triangular merger under I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D)),
46
recapitalization of existing common stock (under I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(E)) 47 or the eligibility to file a consolidated federal income
tax return as members of an affiliated group.48 If a tracking stock
construction is regarded as a class of the undivided company's
stock, the firm can file a consolidated tax return after the issuance
of tracking stock, thereby allowing one division's losses to offset
other divisions' profits.
As will be shown below, tracking stock possesses specially
tailored attributes that are designed to provide investors with the
economic equivalent of an equity stake in a legal entity. This
hybrid form of common stock, therefore, consists of some very
characteristic features provided for by the corporation's articles of
incorporation regarding the rights, powers, and limitations of
shareholders. In any case, it is necessary to differentiate how
closely or loosely the stocks are structured to track their related
business segment. The conclusion for one view or the other leads
to a classic tracking stock culture or a stock culture of different
approaches and determines the structure of the analysis. A
tracking stock culture must be structured carefully to ensure that
the IRS considers the tracking stock to be common stock of the
43 Id. § 301.
44 Id. § 311(b).
45 Id. § 355.
46 Id. § 368(a)(2)(D).
47 Id. § 368(a)(2)(E).
48 See Brown & Handler, Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 133-34; Dahlberg &
Perry, Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual Mergers and
Acquisitions, supra note 5, at 256-57; Finkelstein et al., Tracking Tracking Stock, supra
note 5, at 184.
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company rather than stock of a subsidiary.49 The rule of thumb is
to structure the tracking stock as loosely to the tracked business
segment as possible so that it will be treated like stock of the parent
corporation. Due to this advice, it is the prevailing conclusion that,
in most cases, tracking stock should be considered stock of the
issuer,50 which provides the firm with tremendous tax
advantages.5 Some issues of tax neutral tracking stock structure
briefly will be touched upon again when this Article scrutinizes the
salient features of tracking stock under American corporate law.
3.5. Hybrid and Hidden Risks of Tracking Stock
Holders of tracking stock remain subject to unique risks
involving all of the company's operations. Although the dividends
on tracking stock are linked to the performance of a particular
segment of the corporation, holders of tracking stock, as already
shown, remain stockholders of the whole entity and consequently
all of its assets (i.e., the investment of the shareholders and its
performance expressed by the stock price) cover the liabilities of all
creditors. Further, net losses or special cash payments (especially
dividends) only with respect to one tracked segment may reduce
the funds of the company legally available for the payment of
dividends on the other classes of tracking stock. Thus, tracking
stocks are faced with typical risks. Unlike a carve-out situation, the
return on investment and the value of the stock price are not
exclusively linked to the performance of the tracked segment In
addition, impacts (both positive and negative) arising from
operations of the remaining business or other tracked segments can
affect the firm's overall financial condition and have to be taken
into account for the analyzed tracking stock. Consequently,
49 For example, see the suggestions by Brown & Handler, Tracking Stock,
supra note 5, at 133; Finkelstein et al, Tracking Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 187-
88.
50 Dahlberg & Perry, Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual
Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 5, at 261; see also THEL, SPARTENAKiN, supra
note 7, at 96-99 (emphasizing that this outcome is in the interest of all parties of
the deal and thus should be attainable); Natusch, "Traxking Stocks": aus Sicht des
US-Steuerrechts, supra note 39, at 616.
51 The CFO of U.S. West's Media Group estimated that issuing tracking stock,
instead of doing a spin-off, was likely to save the firm $200 million in potential
taxes over a few years. See D'Souza & Jacob, supra note 6, at 8 n 7.
52 See infra Section 4.1.
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tracking stocks theoretically should never be deemed to be like
stocks of stand-alone corporations.5 3 However, although tracking
stock corporations engage in disclosure of the fact that financial
effects arising from any particular business segment could affect
both the entire outcome of the enterprise and the performance of
other tracked segments, apparently the majority of investors in
tracking stock corporations are not fully aware of the hybrid
structure of this financial tool.54 For some investors, tracking stock
fails with its complexity and the evaluation through capital market
will take this into account.55
3.6. Corporate Governance and Decision-Making Nightmares
The creation of a tracking stock structure basically has no
impact on the legal structure of management. The parent
corporation retains full operating control of all tracked business
groups and only a single board of directors sits for the entire
corporation.5 6 By contrast, in equity carve-outs and spin-offs,
management reports to new and separate boards. The board in a
tracking stock culture, however, is still responsible for formulating
corporate policies and making major corporate decisions regarding
all operative and strategic matters of the entire company. A
separate board of directors related to each individual class of stock
does not legally exist. As already noted, the issuance of tracking
stock potentially creates conflicts between the multiple groups of
shareholders because they are usually provided with different
legal rights and concerned with different financial interests.5 7 And,
53 Hass, supra note 2, at 2117.
54 See GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 32, at 31 (warning that
shareholders of the tracked divisions remain shareholders of the entire
corporation and therefore are subject to all the risks associated with an investment
in the corporation); US WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra 19, at 29; see also DONALDSON
ET AL., PROSPECrUS (May 26, 1999), at 10 ("The board of directors may make
decisions that favor DLJ at the expense of DLJdirect. Due to the extensive
relationships between DLJ and DLJdirect, there will be inherent conflicts of
interest... there can be no assurance that DLJ will not expand its operations to
compete with DLJdirect.").
' Baums, Spartenorganisation, "Tracking Stock" und deutsches Aktienrecht, supra
note 35, at 26.
-6 See, e.g., DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETTE, PROSPEcrus (May 26, 1999), at 10
[hereinafter DLJ-PROPECrUS] (emphasizing this course).
57 For a deeper analysis of the conflicts that arise between shareholders in a
tracking stock culture, see Hass, supra note 2, at 2112-39.
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of course, the board of directors has fiduciary duties to the holders
of each class of stock.8 Hence, tracking stock presents directors
with unique challenges that are not prevalent in conventional
corporations. Indeed, satisfying diametrically competing interests
can create decision-making nightmares for a board of directors5 9
Directorial conflicts principally arising in this context can be
broken down into different categories.60 Primarily, conflicts arise
each time directors make corporate decisions involving allocations
of corporate assets, resources, opportunities, or personnel between
or among the tracked segments. These decisions, which come up
in the case of initial allocations and on an ongoing basis, may have
a significant impact on the prospective reported earnings of the
tracked segment and, as a result, the market value of the security.
For instance, the allocation of interest expense and goodwill may
have a significant influence on the operating result of each group.
Further, the board encounters conflicting interests among
shareholders when repurchasing stock or paying dividends on one
class of stock. Ultimately, transactions and other dealings between
or among the business groups of a tracking stock corporation offer
fertile ground for claims of unfairness and violated duties.
Therefore, viewing the problem from the economic side, tracking
stock might impose agency costs by creating conflicts of interests
5S It is one of the basic principles of American corporate law in general, and
of Delaware corporate law in particular, that directors are subject to the
fundamental fiduciary duties of loyalty and disinterestedness. Moreover, under
American corporate law the fiduciary duties of directors are equal to all
shareholders regardless of the class or series. See Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d
1105, 1124 (Del. 1988); Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545
A.2d. 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 85, 872-73 (Del.
1985). For a recent analysis, see, for example, R. Franldin Balotti et a]., Equity
Ownership and the Duty of Care: Convergence, Revolution, or Evolulion?, 55 Bus. LAw.
661 (2000); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator of Self
Governance, 34 GA. L. REv. 529,539-42 (2000).
59 See Schick, supra note 7, at 1365 ("ITihe tracked business groups are not
independent of the parent corporation, and the parent's board of directors still
governs the affairs of each business group. This creates unique conflicts for
directors who must please multiple groups of stockholders whose interests are not
always consistent").
60 See id. at 1374-77 (categorizing the conflicts as those arising from the
allocation of corporation resources, assets, and opportunities; arising from stock
repurchases or dividend payments to one class of stockholders; and arising from
transactions between competing business groups within a tracking stock
corporation); Hass, supra note 2, at 2120-32 (differentiating six subdivisions).
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over cost allocations, liquidation rights, and internal transfer
payments.61
As with other business decisions and transactions, judicial
review of resource allocations is limited by the business judgment
rule. Generally, the business judgment rule avoids a court's
"second guessing" the decision of a board of directors that acted on
an informed basis, in good faith, upon due inquiry, and without
self interest in a situation involving disparate impacts on the
respective classes.62 However, in tracking stock contexts, the
board's impartiality is typically in question because directors and
executive officers will hold shares or options in both classes of
stocks, but the value represented by one class exceeds the value
represented by the other.63 This presents further potential conflicts.
Nevertheless, for a long time there existed little or no guidance for
directors faced with a tracking stock structure. Of course, several
cases have settled fiduciary duty issues arising in the background
of transactions that affect more than one class of stock.64 In these
decisions Delaware courts have stated that a director's duty of care
runs to the corporation and its shareholders as a body, rather than
to any particular group of stockholders. 6
61 Huang & Knoll, supra note 17, at 188 n.72.
62 Cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (explaining that liability under
the business judgment rule is based upon gross negligence, and therefore there is
a high burden of proof set as the standard).
63 See generally Balotti et al., supra note 58, at 666-71 (illustrating numerous
Delaware opinions which support the concept that directors who are substantial
stockholders will be influenced by their stock ownership).
64 See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947)
(detailing court analysis concerning fiduciary duty issues when there are multiple
classes of stock); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1147 (Del. 1990) (discussing
conflicts that arise when dealing with fiduciary duties and hying to resolve
competing interests among multiple shareholder groups); Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (discussing fairness of dividends among
multiple shareholders); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 595
(Del. Ch. 1986) (describing applications of the "intrinsic fairness" test and the
business judgment rule when dealing with multiple classes of stock).
6 In particular, see Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1147-48 (Del. 1990).
Subsequently applying the business judgment rule, the Court upheld the
directors' decision because it was (at least) intended to further the interests of the
corporation. Because, when any duty owed by directors to the shareholders had to
be considered in the narrow light of their duties to the corporation and all its
shareholders, the interests of a particular group lose weight. For more
information on this case, see Sparks & O'Neill, Merger Issues at the New
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The first Delaware court decisions involving tracking stock
transactions to substantively address allegations that directors
breached their fiduciary duties came up only recently in 1999.0
These cases dealt with actions brought against members of the GM
Board of Directors by holders of GM Class H and Class E stock,
respectively.67 In Solomon v. Armstrong,63 the plaintiff basically
claimed that the director defendants who negotiated and approved
a spin-off of a division of the corporation represented by a different
tracking stock held a disproportionate number of shares and
therefore had a personal financial interest and could not consider
the terms of the transaction impartially. The Court of Chancery,
however, dismissed the plaintiff's claim and stated that directors
often must resolve conflicts among classes of stock, and the fact
that a majority of the directors own more of one class than another
would not necessarily implicate the directors' good faith and
loyalty.69 Further, these allegations fail in the court's opinion to
rebut the business judgment standard of review because the
plaintiffs could not prove that the directors' interest was material.7 0
Millennium: Strategic Deals, Tracking Stocks and the Duty to be hiformed, sitpra note 5,
at 199-200.
66 See Solomon v. Amstrong, 747 A.2d 1098 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 746 A.2d 277
(Del. Super. Ct 2000); In re General Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611
(Del. Ch. 1999). For a comprehensive analysis of these cases, in particular, see
Schick, supra note 7, at 1379-82.
67 The Class E and H stock were, as already described, two of the very first
tracking stocks issued. See, e.g., Borek, supra note 7, at 1107, 1109-11 (describing
GM's use of Class E and Class H stocks as the "first well-documented use of
tracking stock").
68 For more information on this case, see Sparks & O'Neill, Merger Issues at the
New Millennium: Strategic Deals, Tracking Stocks and the Duty to be Informed, supra
note 5, at 204-06, 211-15.
69 Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d at 1118.
70 In considering the reasonableness of the process the court explained:
To the extent that in a given transaction different shareholder classes
have mutually exclusive interests, the ability of the board to act in all of
the shareholders' best interests is seriously complicated. From a
corporate governance perspective, it is precisely this danger that is
endemic to companies with complex capital structures. Even if Delaware
courts recognize that boards of directors routinely and properly have to
make decisions that benefit one class of stock at the expense of another,
where boards choose (or certificates require) a formal procedure to
resolve conflicts due to diverging shareholder interests, the process by
which those decisions are ultimately made must not fundamentally,
without warning, disadvantage one class of stock.
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In re General Motors Class H Shareholders Litigation is based upon
a corresponding reasoning. The Delaware Chancery Court rejected
the argument that disparate ownership rendered a board of
directors "interested" with respect to a transaction involving one of
the corporation's tracking stocks.71 Rather, the Chancery Court
stated that the board of directors was entitled to the benefit of the
business judgment rule in connection with approving the
transaction and submitting it to stockholders, despite the directors'
ownership of far more common stock than that stock, which
tracked the performance of the company's electronics division.
The court cited Freedman v. Restaurant Associate Industries,72 which
stated that the mere fact that directors own more of one class of
stock than another class does not deprive them of the benefits of
the business judgment rule where directors are required to
apportion consideration between two classes of stock. The
Chancery Court further stated that the fact that the stock was a
tracking stock "does not distinguish this case from those in which
boards had to balance the interests of different classes of common
and/or preferred stockholders." 73
[And further:] [a]t the same time, where a board's task is to allocate value
between two classes of stock, I do not think that it is Delaware law that
the board has to set up an exacting process that actually replicates an
arm's-length transaction between shareholders. As a matter of common
practice a literal arm's-length negotiation happens when a soon-to-be-
subsidiary tracking stock company is first merged into another company
(e.g., when EDS first became part of the GM corporation). During that
process negotiators for the prospective subsidiary can anticipate future
conflicts of interest and draft appropriate provisions to deal with them
under the certificate of incorporation. This is clearly a more efficient
method of coping with potential divergences of interest between
shareholder groups than having courts adapt procedural mechanisms
(e.g., special committees, burden shifts, etc.) that are unnecessary or
poorly adapted to new contexts. Where, as here, the pre-split-off
certificate of incorporation provides for powerful procedural protections
for all classes of stock, I think that it is inappropriate for a court to
impose unhelpful requirements in the name of common law fiduciary
duties.
Id. at 1124.
71 In re General Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 618-19 (Del.
Ch. 1999).
72 Freedman v. Rest. Assoc. Indus., No. CIV.A.9212, 1987 WL 14323, at "10
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16,1987) (mem.).
73 In re General Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d at 619.
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Although only superficially, this analysis shows that Delaware
courts have, until now, been reluctant to develop a special
standard for dealing with directorial duties in a tracking stock
corporation. Rather, they still tend to apply the traditional
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to directors in corporations
issuing tracking stock, and have also proposed to analogize to the
directorial duties owed to preferred stockholders74 or to minority
stockholders in a controlled subsidiary.7 5 In contrast, legal scholars
argue that the traditional approaches to corporate governance-
such as the fiduciary analysis, the contractual method or the entire
fairness standard-are insufficient to determine the unique duty
issues of directors in a tracking stock corporation.76 Thus, some
recommend the application of a combination of the existing
traditional standards depending on the transaction entered into by
the corporation/ 7 whereas others who are even more extreme
argue that the business judgment rule should not be applied
altogether.78 Rather, this point of view attempts to establish a
newly created "duty of fairness" when directors are making
decisions and formulating policies that could have disparate
impacts on the tracked business segments.
It is not the task of this investigation to contribute a convincing
scholarly solution to one of the most interesting and challenging
problems of tracking stock under American corporate law.
Nevertheless, it might be helpful for the upcoming examination
under German corporate law and to understand what is
problematic. It is also interesting to see how American
74 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, 77e Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And
WAhy We Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443 (1996) (explaining that preferred
stockholders are like all other stockholders and are owed directorial duties over
the "corporate entity itself"); Schick, supra note 7, at 1382-84 (describing how
courts treat preferred stockholders). For the much more peculiar problem of the
protection of preferred stockholders against common stock's direction of
corporate affairs, see Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law,
38 B.C. L. REV. 595,648-53 (1997).
7S See Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1999) (arguing
that a splitoff of a tracking stock line is radically different from freezing out
minority stockholders).
76 Hass, supra note 2, at 2177; Schick, supra note 7, at 1367.
77 Schick, supra note 7, at 1393-97.
78 Hass, supra note 2, at 2092; cf. Stuart R. Cohn, Corporate Natural Lao: The
Dominance of Justice in a Codified World, 48 FLA. L REv. 551, 557 (1996) (discussing
the types of standards that should be applied and how well they address issues).
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corporations attempt to handle the requirements of fiduciary
duties and the business judgment rule in the praxis of tracking
stock. To avoid conflicts among the several classes or series of
shareholders and the involvement of the board, companies adopt
as a prophylactic measure management and accounting policies in
advance.79 These policies contain sets of rules as to the interactions
between the groups of holders of the different classes of stock
before certain actions are taken, e.g., dividend and accounting
policies, the allocation of various expenses, and liabilities. Further
examples of such policies are those requiring payment of fair value
if one business group acquires an asset from the other, and policies
requiring commercial arrangements between the tracked groups to
be struck on arms-length terms. Operating Committees may also
be useful to the board of directors in managing the tracked assets
and resolving inter-group conflicts. These policies and institutions
are helpful in order to provide the basis for financial statement
preparation and to reduce the potential for fiduciary conflicts.
3.7. Preferences Regarding Other Methods of Diversification
Issuance of tracking stock has some similarities to spin-offs and
equity carve-outs because all of them lead to diversification of the
firm. However, the crucial differences lay in the details.
3.Z1. Spin-Off
For a long time in the United States the common attempt to
enhance shareholder value has been the "spin-off," which is also
referred to as the "split-off." A spin-off divides the existing asset
base of a corporation into two or more separate units. The
common structure is that the "tracked" assets of the parent are
dropped into a new subsidiary that is then spun off to shareholders
of the issuer. As such it usually does not involve any cash. Yet, the
79 For more details, see Hawthorne, Tracking Stock Terms, Methods of Issuance,
Advantages and Disadvantages, supra note 5, at 55; Steinberger & Hass, Introduction
to Tracking Stocks, supra note 5, at 540. See, e.g., RALSTON PROXY STATEMENT, supra
note 19, at 30-32 (describing Ralston's policies and the implementation of these
policies); SEAGULL ENERGY CORP., PROXY STATEMENT (May 2, 1994) [hereinafter
SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT], at 24-27 (detailing Seagull Pipeline Corporation's
rules on shares and directorship); US WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 42-
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investor has two types of common stock as a result of the spin-off
in her or his portfolio: one representing a direct equity interest in
the parent corporation minus the spun-off subsidiary, and the
other representing a direct equity interest in the spun-off
subsidiary.80 Thus, a spin-off is a dear-cut separation of the two
divisions because after the transaction there are no connections
between the entities either at the firm (management) level or at the
shareholder level. Nonetheless, the financial engineering idea
corresponds to the implementation of tracking stock. Each type of
stock will trade independently in the market and presumably
mirror the value of each tracked segment.
3.72. Carve-Out
An equity carve-out is the distribution of stock in a subsidiary.
The shares of the subsidiary can be sold through a secondary
offering by the parent company or through a secondary offering by
the subsidiary itself. Usually, the "tracked" assets are dropped
into a subsidiary and the subsidiary engages in an initial public
offering ("IPO") of its stock. The parent and the new subsidiary
often remain consolidated for tax purposes. Equity carves-outs are
the source of cash to the parent firm through the public sale of
equity that has a claim on the subsidiary's assets alone. The
difference between an equity carve-out and an issue of tracking
stock is that the latter does not lead to a parent-subsidiary
relationship. In addition, issuance of tracking stock usually entails
no external financing, so there is no dilution of the ownership
interest of the original shareholder.
3.7.3. Prevailing Reasons for Tracking Stock
Although all of these structures can basically lead to the same
economic result, a tracking stock equity structure has several
advantages over the other mentioned corporate strategies.P The
major benefit lies in the financing capacity and flexibility of
80 Hass, supra note 2, at 2109.
M For more details, see D'Souza & Jacob, supra note 6, at 7-9 (comparing
targeted stocks with equity carve-outs and spin-offs); Hass, supra note 2, at 2109-
11 (discussing the advantages of a tracking stock equity structure over traditional
spin-off strategies); Logue et al., supra note 6, at 48 (summarizing the advantages
of targeted stock).
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tracking stock. Unlike equity carve-outs or spin-offs, the business
groups underlying a tracking stock are managed by a single board
of directors that is able to maximize synergies between the tracked
group and the remaining group. Tracking stock also permits the
continuation of synergies arising from the operation of a larger
enterprise (e.g., counter-cyclical nature of distinct lines of business;
sharing of administrative costs; lower borrowing rates, etc.). The
result is only a fictive separation of diverse businesses while the
corporation maintains full control and enjoys the advantages of a
large-scale organization.82 All of this, in principle, increases a
firm's total debt capacity because it still retains the effect of
diversification. Regarding the equity capacity, each of the tracked
segments still can be used separately to raise funds and may
enhance the corporation's flexibility to raise new equity.
Table 2: Comparison of Structural Optionsfor DiversificationO3
Tracking Stock Equity Carve- Spin-Off
Out
Legal Form No impact on Separate legal Separate and
legal form; entity; independent
single Board of two boards of entity,
Directors directors two boards of
directors
Control Maintain full Control Entire loss of
control; depending control
Impact on on levelds of
fiduciary duties ownership of
parent
82 A good example is the Tele-Communications ("TCI") deal, in which
existing common stock was redesignated as TCI Group Common Stock, and in a
recapitalization, each share of TCI Group Common received one quarter of a
share of Liberty Media Group Stock. The plan separated the media businesses
from other communications businesses. TELE-COMMUNICATION, INC. (TCI),
REGISTRATION STATEMENT 12 (filed Nov. 9, 1995), available at http://www .sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/96903/0000950123-95-003220.txt; see Brown & Handler,
Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 161.
83 See Ingo Natusch, 50 DER BETRIEB [DB] 1141,1142 (1997).
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4. TRACKING STOCK BASIcS UNDER AMERICAN LAW
4.1. Salient Corporate Features of Tracking Stock
Although each tracking stock culture in most cases is unique,
some variations on primary corporate characteristics typically
distinguish tracking stock from normal common stock. The
specific terms of the tracking stocks that matter in this context and
require delineation include: (1) voting rights; (2) dividend policy;
(3) liquidation rights; and (4) redemption and exchange provisions.
4.1.1. Voting Rights
Holders of tracking stock typically have voting rights and
generally exercise them as shareholders of the issuer, i.e., one vote
for each share on all matters upon which common stockholders are
2001]
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entitled to vote. So far as the certificate or the articles of
incorporation do not provide such a right, the corporate law of the
state in which the corporation was organized grants it.84 However,
tracking stockholders usually do not have special voting rights
regarding the tracked assets or businesses. Certificates or articles
of incorporation of tracking stock generally provide that, unless the
state otherwise requires, all holders of tracking stock vote together
as one class on all issues coming before common shareholders.
Delaware corporate law requires a separate class vote on matters
that could adversely affect the rights of the holders of a particular
class of stock and on any other matter specifically set forth in the
corporation's certificate or articles of incorporation.8 Thus, it is
likely that, in all cases concerning an economic or legal cut in the
tracking stockholders' position, they will vote together as one
class.8 6
Voting rights may be fixed at the time of issuance or floating.
87
The issue of fixed versus floating voting rights is important
because, in many cases requiring a shareholder vote, tracking stock
investors vote as a single class when, e.g., the structure of the firm
will be affected. Hence, voting rights can potentially impact the
ability of holders of one class of tracking stock to control the
outcome of a shareholder vote and thus affect the possibility of a
change in corporate control.88
In the first case, each class typically receives either one vote or
some fraction of one per share. The vote per share of the tracking
stock is fixed at the time that the proposal creating the class is
approved. This loosely tracking stock approach is easy to handle
in praxis, but does not pay attention to changes in the market
valuation and relative importance of the different tracked business
segments in the whole company. In the second and more common
case, the voting rights are subject to periodic adjustments based on
relative market values. This closely tracking stock approach can be
84 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §§ 151(g), 212, 215(a)-(b) (1991).
85 See id. §§ 102(b)(4), 242(b)(2).
86 Natusch, Neue Wege der Beteiligungsfinanzierung deutscher Unternehmen
durch die Ausgabe von "Tracking Stocks?," supra note 35, at 1146.
87 See Hawthorne, Tracking Stock Terms, Methods of Issuance, Advantages and
Disadvantages, supra note 5, at 52; Steinberger & Hass, Introduction to Tracking
Stocks, supra note 5, at 534.
88 Logue et al., supra note 6, at 46.
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further broken down in the different times of the adjustments.
They can be made either prior to each shareholder vote or at fixed
temporal periods, such as monthly or annually. For instance, the
already mentioned tracking stock structure in the case of USX
provided to be periodically adjusted to conform to the relative
market values, whereas GM's tracking stock had fixed voting
rights which could cause distortion if the relative market values of
the stocks changed.
There are a couple of reasons why a floating voting system
does matter. 9 First of all, it complies with the economic and legal
reasoning that in corporations, ideally the power of voting should
correspond to the value of the investment of each shareholder.
Moreover, because floating voting systems are tied directly to a
targeted segment's relative value they vest more decision-making
in those business segments representing a greater portion of
overall company value. This offers a disincentive for the
management to divert resources to the less successful business
groups.
However, while floating related voting systems are provided
with these mentioned economic rewards and represent the classic
tracking stock culture approach, even under American corporate
law they are faced with serious legal and practical problems.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, in order to prepare the
investigation under German law these issues should be touched
upon. Because the relative market capitalization of each class of
tracking stock naturally changes from time to time and virtually
can never remain at the same level, the holder of shares of the
different classes of tracking stock in the same corporation become
an unequal number of votes per share.90 Even more evident is the
case in which only the voting rights of the tracked stock will be
adjusted to equal the quotient of the weighted average market
value of one stock, whereas the voting rights of the remaining
outstanding are always fixed at one vote.91 This raises some
questions because the general rule determines that the voting
9 Id.
90 See Hass, supra note 2, at 2096-97.
91 See, e.g., US WEST PROXY STATEIMENT, supra note 19, at 56-53 (discussing how
each outstanding share of its communications stock will have one vote, while the
number of votes of its outstanding Media Stock will be a fraction calculated
according to the Average Market Value).
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rights of the shares of stock of a particular class or a particular
series within a class cannot be varied.92 Delaware corporate law
only provides that the right to vote associated with shares of a
particular class or series within that class may be denied outright
or may be limited to specific matters. Moreover, more or less than
one vote per share may be granted to the share of any class or
series, and the separate vote of a class or series may be required
before specific corporate actions may be taken.93
Furthermore, in order to preserve favorable tax treatment, care
must be taken that the nature of any class vote does not delegate
too much control over the specified unit to holders of the targeted
stock so that the targeted stock continues to be considered equity
of the parent. However, in most cases holders of tracking stock
will not have direct voting power in the tracked entity or assets.
Even if the voting power in the corporation switches to the benefit
of the holders of tracking stock, they have voting rights only as to
the issuer. Therefore, of the primary characteristics of tracking
stock, voting rights are typically the least problematic when
making the determination of whose stock the tracking stock
represents.94
4.1.2. Dividend Rights
Of the four primary characteristics, none defines tracking stock
more than dividend rights. At the time the tracking stock plan is
enacted, issuers may announce the proposed dividend policies of
the respective units in order to appraise the market of the equity
characteristics of the security. However, the dividend policy (i.e.,
how much of the tracked business' earnings are to be distributed)
still remains at the discretion of the Board of Directors of the issuer.
This discretion-exercised in good faith and regarding the
restrictions on dividend distributions -encompasses the legal
power to declare and pay dividends exclusively on one or another
class of tracking stock, and further to all classes in equal or unequal
amounts. However, according to the idea of this financial tool,
92 Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
93 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(a)(4), 102(b)(1), 102(b)(4), 151(a), 212(a) (1991).
94 Dahlberg & Perry, Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual
Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 5, at 259.
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dividend rights of tracking stock generally are based on the
earnings of the tracked business.95
As determined by state corporate law, dividends are solely
payable out of the funds of the corporation that are legally
available. Therefore, it is important to understand that the
dividend payments of any tracking stock are subject to the same
limitations that exist on other classes of common stock and to
clearing up dividends in arrears on outstanding stock. In
Delaware, corporations can pay dividends only out of surplus (i.e.,
assets minus liabilities minus capital) or net profits, each calculated
at the parent level and not the business unit level.% Thus,
corporations cannot pay a dividend on tracking stock, even though
the business unit is fabulously successful, if the company as a
whole has no surplus or net profits. This important result must be
retaken for the analysis under German corporate law.
A further important restriction on the dividend policy of the
board in tracking stock cultures might be the charter of the
corporation.97  In a closely structured tracking stock culture
dividends are restricted by the charter of the corporation to paid-in
surplus and consolidated net income attributable to the business
segments related to those stoScks. In this case, dividend policy
corresponds to the outcome of the tracked class ("stand alone
basis").98 High earnings in the profit center lead to equally high
dividends, whereas in times when the tracked segment fails to
9 Logue et al., supra note 6, at 46.
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. ,§§ 141(a), 170(a).
97 See Steinberger & Hass, Introduction to Tracking Stocks, supra note 5, at 531-
32. Furthermore, in praxis cash distributions to shareholders are also typically
constrained by covenants in corporate bonds and loan agreements. These
covenants limit the total amount of funds that can be distributed to shareholders,
thereby preventing management from activities that benefit shareholders at the
expense of creditors.
9 This amount equates substantially to the amount that would be legally
available for the payment of dividends if the tracked segment were a separate,
stand-alone corporation. See, e.g., GENZMIE PROXY STATMENT, supra note 32, at 43-
44 (explaining Genzyme's dividend policy); TCI PROXY STATe.mN, supra note 19,
at 55-57 (discussing that their Liberty Media Group Available Dividend Amount
is to be similar to what is legally obtainable to pay the Liberty Media Group
common stock's dividends); US WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra 19, at 47-48
(detailing how their Communication Group's financial statements are credited
with an amount equal to the Media Stock's dividends, according to certain
calculations); USX-MARATHON PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 15 (explaining
the limitations placed upon dividend distribution).
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generate earnings, the board is precluded from declaring and
paying a dividend, even if the company as a whole has performed
very profitably and earned a fund legally available for the payment
of dividends on common stock. As a result, this means that the
company-corresponding to a group of certain entities-is not
allowed to transfer profits from a successful to a less successful
business segment. However, a dividend policy like that can be
reached in a tracking stock culture that corresponds more "loosely"
to the performance of the particular business segments. In this
case, for instance, the company's charter permits the board
payment of dividends on every class up to legally available
amounts; i.e., the profitability is just one element in the dividend
policy of the board.
However, although the charter may link the shareholders'
earnings to the performance of a tracked unit on a stand-alone
basis, the above-mentioned restrictions on state law prevent the
treatment of holders of tracking stock in terms of tax law as
shareholders of the underlying business segment. Due to possible
negative earnings of other divisions or subsidiaries of the issuing
company, dividends linked to the performance of one business
unit do not equate tracking stock with stock of this unit.99
4.1.3. Liquidation Rights
Holders of tracking stock do not have a special right to the
tracked assets.100 Upon the liquidation or winding up of the
corporation, holders of common stock share ratably, based on the
number of shares held in any assets of the corporation remaining
once creditors and preferred stockholders have received all
amounts owed to them.101 Liquidation rights among the
shareholders are often based on the relative values of the tracked
and total assets at the time of issuance (predetermined ration) but
99 Dahlberg & Perry, Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual
Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 5, at 260.
100 See GENZYME PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 32, at 46 (explaining that in the
event of liquidation or winding up of affairs, the holders of the tracked stock
would receive the remaining assets for distribution to common stockholders, but
would not have a direct claim against any particular asset of the company);
SEAGULL PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 79, at 38; TCI PROXY STATEMENT, supra note
19, at 30; US WEsr PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 29.
101 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, §§ 280-281 (1991).
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can also be fixed in proportion to relative market capitalization
immediately prior to liquidation (relative market capitalization). 02
On one hand, the latter construction avoids a distribution of funds
that is not reflective of the relative market values of the divisions at
the time of liquidation and represents a closer tracking stock
culture. One the other hand, it leads again to unequal treatment
regarding each single share and might therefore trigger legal
problems. 0 3 However, as long as holders of tracking stock must
look to the net of the issuer's assets in excess of liabilities and have
no security interest in or special liquidation rights to receive the
tracked assets, there will be, from a tax perspective at least, no
treatment as a taxable tracking stock transaction. o4
4.1.4. Exit: Conversion and Redenption Rights
In organizing capital structure, consideration should always be
given to exit strategies in case the objectives of the firm or the
investor are reached or changed. Like other corporate finance
tools, the establishment of tracking stock need not be an
irreversible "one way" decision. 05 This means future restructuring
options of the company are not blocked because tracking stocks, if
properly structured, typically contain an "unwind" feature,
allowing the corporation, at the board's discretion, to reverse the
transaction and reinstate the status quo ante.'05 Such an exit may be
dependent on dividend history, market capitalization, or the
passage of some minimum period of time.107 As this provides, the
issuer can elect to convert the tracking stock, often at a designated
102 See RALSrON PROXY STATFiErTr, supra note 19, at 41; SEAGULL PROxy
STATEMENT, supra note 79, at 59; TCI PROXY STATMENT, supra note 19, at 71; USX-
DELH PROXY STATEMNT, supra note 11, at 14.
103 This may be the reason why US West switched to fixed liquidation rights
for its classes of tracking stock and thus to a more "loosely" tracking stock culture.
See US WEST PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 19, at 58-59.
104 See Brown & Handler, Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 133; Finkelstein et aL,
Tracking Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 187.
105 Conversion rights and redemption at the option of the corporation are
generally permissible under Delaware corporation law. See DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 151(b)-(e).
10s Steinberger & Hass, Introduction to Tracking Stocks, supra note 5, at 528.
107 Dahlberg & Perry, Tracking Stock. Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and
Virtual Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 5, at 250.
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premium108 or at a prescribed formula,109 into another class of
stock, consequently leaving only one class of common stock
outstanding that represents the entire equity in the company (call
exchange).i0 The construction that permits the issuer to "split-off"
or to "carve-out" the tracked assets under defined circumstances is
possible. In some transactions, the tracking stock automatically
converts to another class of stock. A mandatory exchange of
tracking stocks or redemption is generally triggered if the issuer
sells the tracked assets."' In other instances, conversion may be
one of several options." 2
4.2. Implementation and Issuance of Tracking Stock
4.2.1. Implementation
In its executive function, the board has to plan, structure, and
implement a tracking stock culture. The most important and
demanding task of the board here is to determine and to design the
segments or subsidiaries into which each particular business the
company should be tracked. The parent must then allocate its
assets, liabilities, profits, and expenses (including interest, taxes,
and overhead) between the specified units or between the specified
unit and the remainder. Further, explicit decisions include the
allowable dividends for each category of stock. As already
emphasized, there must be a clear understanding within the firm
108 One example of this is the sale of Continental Baking's subsidiary by
Ralston Purina and conversion of CBG shares (which tracked Continental Baking)
into RPG shares (residual) at a fifteen percent premium. See Brown & Handler,
Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 154.
109 For the wealth consequences for shareholders depending on the
alternatives, see Logue et al., supra note 6, at 46-48.
110 See DEi- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(e) (1991). Under Delaware corporate law,
such convertibility may be at the option of the stockholder, the corporation, or
both. The specific provision detailing the convertibility features of classes of stock
must be set forth in the corporation's certificate of incorporation. See id. §§
102(a)(4), 151(a)-(e) (requiring a provision in the articles of incorporation to
specify the qualifications, limitations, and restrictions with respect to any class of
stock).
111 Hawthorne, Tracking Stock Terms, Methods of Issuance, Advantages and
Disadvantages, supra note 5, at 53.
112 See Brown & Handler, Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 126.
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itself about how joint costs will be allocated across different types
of the target business units.
After the financial and management issues are handled, the
board is almost only concerned with technical legal matters
regarding the implementation of the new stocks. A proxy
statement describing the proposed amendments to the company's
charter must be prepared and filed. Shareholder approval of the
amendment to the certificate of articles of incorporation of the
company is required to issue common stock as tracking stock.
Such an amendment will define the number and the kind of the
particular business groups, designate the classes of tracking stock
and the number of authorized shares of each class, and establish
the already discussed rights, powers, and limitations of the




Tracking stock commonly has been issued by a recapitalization
of existing common into new common ("other stock") and tracking
stock or by a distribution of tracking stock on the common stock.
The former method is more declarative in nature because other
stock automatically becomes a tracking stock since it tracks other
business (including any "retained" interest in tracked business),13
The latter method means that the company redesignates the
outstanding share of common stock, for example, as a share of
Group A common stock (which stock is established to track the
performance of the remaining, but also newly defined business
segment named "Group A"), and, simultaneously, distributes
shares of the other newly created class of Group B common stock
(which is designed to track the performance of the other new
business segment named "Group B") to all existing shareholders
on the basis of a predetermined distribution ratio 14 Both methods
are practiced."5- Some companies, such as Sprint Corporation,
113 Id. at 127.
114 Steinberger & Hass, Introduction to Tracking Stocks, supra note 5, at529-30.
I's See Hawthorne, Tracking Stock Terms, Methods of Issuance, Advantages and
Disadvantages, supra note 5, at 52.
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have chosen to reclassify the core stock to express the notion that
the shares reflect the performance of a tracked business segment.
Other companies, such as General Motors, have chosen to continue
to refer to their core stock as "common stock" of the corporation.
4.2.2.2. Initial Public Offering
It is increasingly coming into vogue that companies sell shares
of a special class of tracking stock in an IPO. Tracking stock sold in
an IPO usually represents only a portion of the tracked business
with the remaining interest retained as an element of the other
stock." 6 The prevailing advantage of an IPO is that, by broadening
the shareholder base, the company can raise new cash, which can
be allocated to the newly created tracked segment or to the core
segment, i.e., raising capital in connection with a new business."
7
In addition, an IPO provides the chance to actively market the
shares on a roadshow, where new potential investors can be better
reached and informed about the new tracking stock.
4.2.2.3. M&A Currency
The third common method of distribution arises in M&A
contexts. Target company shareholders receive tracking stock in
the acquiring firm in exchange for their ownership stake in the
target company. As already demonstrated, this approach allows
target firm shareholders to still keep their investor objective, rather
than invest in the combined conglomerate after the deal.
5. TRACKING STOCK UNDER GERMAN CORPORATE LAW
Given the advantages of such a powerful financial innovation
like tracking stock, one might wonder why tracking stock
transactions have neither been completed nor announced yet in
Germany. Indeed, whereas German firms and their legal and
financial advisors are still reluctant to launch a tracking stock
culture, German scholars have already caught up with the
116 See Steinberger & Hass, Introduction to Tracking Stocks, supra note 5, at 530.
117 See, e.g., DLJ-PRoSiEcrs, supra note 56, at 3 (redefining DLJ common
stock to exclude interest in performance of online services of DLJ Direct and
public offering of DLJ Direct Stock to track the company's online brokerage
business). For more information on this deal, see Finkelstein et al., Tracking
Tracking Stock, supra note 5, at 195-202.
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discussion in the United States. Until now, several investigations
have scrutinized the implementation of tracking stock in terms of
financial issues," 8 as well as in terms of corporate law,1 19 tax law,2
and accounting principles.i 2
118 MANUEL BAUER, TARGETED STOCKS ALS ALTERNATIVE ZU DE_5iNVIrTIo.'ONEN
(2000); CHFMSTOPHER JAEGER, TARGETED STOCK ALS RESTRUKURIERUNGSINSRUM.ENT:
AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF DAS SHAREHOLDER VALUE-MANAGEMIT DIVERSIFIZIERTER
KONZERNGESELLSCHAFTEN (1999) [hereinafter JAEGER, TARGETED STOCK AIS
RESTRUKTURiERUNGSINSTRUMENT]; Ingo Natusch, Empirisclie Analysen zur
Beteiligungsfinanzierung mit "Traxking Stocks": Ein CLerblick, 8 INTENATIOiALES
STEuERREcHT [IStR] 122 (1999) [hereinafter Natusch, Empirisdce Analy-en zur
Beteiligungsfinanzierung mit "Traxking Stocks"]; NATUSCH, TRACKING STOCK ALS
INSTRU m-NT DER BETEIUGUNGSFINANZIERUNG DIVERSIF1ZIERTER UNT0RR ,* N, slpra
note 27; Steiner & Natusch, supra note 38, at 580; Natusch, Neoe Wege der
Beteiligungsfinanzierung deutscher Unternehnten durch die Ausgabe von "Tracking
Stocks"?, supra note 35, at 1141; Mark Wahrenburg, Spinoffs sind keine 1AAundermi tel
[Spin-offs are no Wonder Drug], VISION+MONEY, 34-36, April 2000.
119 THIEL, SPARTENAKTIEN, supra note 7; Baums, Sparlenorganisation, "Tracking
Stock" und deutsches Aktienrecht, supra note 35, at 35; Ulrich H. Brauer, Die
Zuldssigkeit der Ausgabe sog. "Tracking Stocks" durd Aktiengeseflschaften nadt
deutschem Aktienrecht, 38 DIE AKIIENGFSELLSCHAFr [AG] 324 (1993); Rolf Miller,
"Tracking Stock" und seine Realisierbarkeit in deutschen Gcsellsdzaftsrecht, 4
WIRTSCHAFsRECHTLICHE BERATUNG [WiB] 57 (1997); Harald Plewka,
Gestaltungsmeiglichkeiten mit "Tracking Stocks" bei Kapital- und Personengesellschafen,
in GESTALTUNG UND ANALYSE IN DER RECHTs-, WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERBERATUNG
133-45 (Haarmann et al. eds., 1998); Jfirgen J. Sieger & Kai Hasselbach, "Trading
Stock" im deutschen Aktienrecht-Im Blickpunkt: Praktisdw 1berlegungen zur
Einfahrung von "subsidiary"f'divisional" shares, 54 B rIES-BERATER (BB) 1277
(1999) [hereinafter Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares]; jirgen J.
Sieger & Kai Hasselbach, "Tracking Stock" in deutsdien Aktien und
Kapitalmarktrecht, 46 DI AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 391 (2001) [hereinafter Sieger
& Hasselbach, Tracking Stock]. Regarding the general legal issues of
diversification in corporations, see Maximilian Schiessi, Gesellschafts- und
mitbestimmungsrechtliche Probleme der Partenorganisation (Divisionalisienig), 21
Z scHRiiT FOR UNERNEM1EIs- UND GESEL.SCHAFrSRECHT [ZGR] 64 (1992).
120 Gottfried E. Breuninger, Hybride Beteiligungsstrukhtren, in JAHRBUCH DER
FACHANvALTE FOR STEUERRECHT [JBFST] 412 (1998/1999). For the American tax
issues from the German perspective, see also Natusch, "Traxking Stocks": ats Sidit
des US-Steuerrechts, supra note 39.
121 Hans-Joachim B6cking & Birka Benecke, Der Entwurf des DRSC zur
Segmentberichterstattung "E-DRS 3," Eine Orientierung an dent Standard SFAS 131
des FASB und/oder an dent Standard IAS 14 revised des IASC?, 52 DIE
WIRTScHAFsPROFuNG [WPG] 839 (1999); Carsten P. Claussen, Kapitalfltilredmung
und Segmentbericzterstattung, 28 ZEITScHRIFT FOR UNTERNEH ENS- IND
GFsELLscHAFrsREcHT [ZGR] 499 (1999); Ingo Natusch, Konzeptionelle Grundlagen
der Rechnungslegung von U.S.-Aktiengesellsdafien mit Tracking Stock-Struklur, 51 DIE
WIRTSCHAFSPROMFUNG [WPG] 459 (1998) [hereinafter Natusch, Konzeptionelle
Grundlagen der Rechnungslegung von U.S.-Aktiengesellsdaflen mit Tracking Stock-
Struktur].
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Like the situation in the United States, there is no special law
governing the issuance and handling of tracking stock. The only
legal entity in Germany that is able to offer publicly traded shares
is the stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft).122 An Aktiengesellschaft
is a joint stock corporation governed by a special and very strict
law, the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz/AktG or "the Act").123
This statute is surely not a product of a "race to the bottom."124
The Stock Corporation Act is so strict and inflexible that many
American lawyers wonder how German companies manage to
reasonably accomplish corporate transactions under this statute. It
is for the most part a relatively old law, having been adopted in
1965, whereas its general provisions and principles are more than
one hundred years old.125
122 See §§ 38, 71, 78 German Exchange Act (Bdrsengesetz/BirsG); see also
Theodor Baums, Aktienmarkt und Finanzierung kleiner Unternehmen, 18 ZEITSCI-IRIFT
FOR WIRTSCHAFISRECHT [ZIP] 1942,1943 (1997).
123 Aktiengesetz [German Corporation Act] v. 10.8.1965 (BGB1. II S. 1089)
[hereinafter AktG].
124 However, German corporate law will for sure be affected in the future by
the "race to the bottom" or "race to the top" discussion under European corporate
law. See, e.g., MATHIAS HABERSACK, EUROPAISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT margin
no. 15 ff. (1999); Martina Deckert, Harmonisierungsbedarf und Harmonisierungs-
grenzen im Europaischen Gesellschaftsrecht, 64 RABELZ' ZEITSCHRIFT [RABELSZ] 478,
484-85, 488-89 (2000); Werner F. Ebke, Unternehmensrecht und Binnenmarkt, 62
RABELZ' ZErTscHRuFr [RABELsZ] 195 (1998); Klaus J. Hopt, Europisches und deutsches
(abernahmerecht, 161 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZI-IR] 368, 381 (1997) (demonstrating the issue on the example
take-over law); Hanno Merkt, Europfiische Rechtssetzung und strengeres autonones
Recht, 61 RABELZ' ZEITscHRIFr [RABELSZ] 647 (1997) (investigating the leeway of
national legislators under European law to establish different standards of
protection); York Schnorbus, Autonome Harmonisierung in den Mitgliedstaaten durch
die Inkoporation von Gemeinschaftsrecht - Eine Untersuchung zur einheitlichen
Anwendung und Auslegung europdiischen und autonomen Rechts und zur
entsprechenden Zustdndigkeit des EuGH im Vorabentscheidungsverfahren, 65 RABELZ'
ZEITSCHRIFT [RABELSZ] (forthcoming 2001) (analyzing the phenomena that national
legislators voluntarily adopt and copy European law); Wolfgang Schon,
Mindestharmonisierung im europfiischen Gesellschaftsrecht, 160 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS
GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 221, 232 (1996); Peter von
Wilmowsky, Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht in einem Gemeinsamen Markt, 56
RABELZ' ZEITSCHRIFT [RABELSZ] 521 (1992) (analyzing the discussion about
competition among legislators in the European community). For the European
development from the American perspective, see, for example, ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 128-47 (1993).
125 For the history of the Aktienrecht, see, for example, KARSTEN ScI-IMIDT,
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 769-74 (3d ed. 1997); Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of
Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate
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Because of the general preponderance of codes and statutes,
German law is generally described as code or civil law, especially
when compared to such common law jurisdictions as the United
Kingdom and the United States. In the context of a comparison of
American and German corporate law, the differences between
these two law systems and their impacts must be taken into
account and will also influence the following investigation.
Because Delaware corporate law is so flexible and open for
innovations, American lawyers tend to create comprehensive
contracts and deal documentation, similar to short custom-made
codes. Doing this, they provide themselves with the necessary
legal basis. German lawyers, in contrast, are generally not so busy
in paper work, although the approach of American lawyers has its
impacts. The documentation of corporate transactions relies to a
large extent on general rules laid down in statutes and on the
methods of generally accepted methods of interpretation. In doing
this, one of the most serious concerns under the German corporate
law is whether a deal structure is permissible under the Stock
Corporation Act.
This investigation gets started with a short overview of the
structure of the German stock corporation and recent changes.
Then it raises the question whether the Stock Corporation Act
indeed provides serious hurdles to structure a tracking stock
culture and for an efficient corporate governance. Eventually it
will prove how a tracking stock can be implemented and which
exit strategies are available.
5.1. Basics of the German Stock Corporation
The stock corporation is a legal entity strictly separate from its
stockholders. The stock corporation has a tripartite structure. The
mandatory organs are the shareholders' meeting
(Hauptversammlung), the supervisory board (Azifsichtsrat),127 and
the executive or management board (Vorstand).= The
shareholders elect the members of the supervisory board and the
Structures, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L 555, 556-59 (2000) (comparing US. and
German corporate governance systems).
126 §§ 118-147, AktG.
127 §§ 95-116, AktG.
128 §§ 76-94, AktG.
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supervisory board appoints the members of the executive board.
Besides the principal functions of appointment,129 supervision,130
and removal,' 3' the supervisory board is also involved in major
corporate transactions and the development of long-range
company goals.132  The management board administers and
represents the stock corporation.133 Its power to represent and
bind the stock corporation is unrestricted and cannot be limited
against third parties (intra vires). Thus, unlike in the United States,
in Germany there is not just one board of directors, but a two-tier
system, under which the management board and the supervisory
board are separated 34
The shareholders generally act only through the shareholders'
meeting, which management and supervisory board members are
expected to attend'35.136 The functions of the shareholders' meeting
are basically limited to passing resolutions concerning the
corporation's legal and financial structure, electing and recalling
members of the supervisory board, appointing auditors and
discharging the responsibility of or pursuing claims against board
members. 37 Resolutions regarding the firm's legal structure
requiring shareholder approval include amendments to the
articles, consent to control agreements (intercompany
agreements), 138 mergers, transformation of legal form, transfer of
all assets or, according to case law,139 transfer of major assets of the
129 § 84, AktG.
130 § 111, AktG.
131 § 84,AktG.
132 In particular, see §§ 90,111, AktG.
133 §§ 76(1), 78(1), AktG.
134 However, it has to be taken into account that in the United States, there
are de facto two boards as well. The board of directors on the one hand and the
formal or informal "executive committee" of the executives on the other.
135 § 118, AktG.
136 Most routine matters, including the election of shareholder
representatives to the supervisory board, require a majority of the votes actually
cast at a shareholder meeting. § 133, AktG. Generally, the Stock Corporation Act
provides that most extraordinary matters need the approval of seventy-five
percent of the votes cast. See, e.g., § 179(2), AktG.
137 § 119, AktG.
138 See §§ 291-307, AktG.
139 See Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of February 25, 1982, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] v.83,122.
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corporation. In addition, and of importance for the following
analysis, the shareholders' meeting must consent to allocation of
the earnings of the company.140 Although at first glance there
might be significant parallels between the German stock
corporation law and many U.S. corporate law jurisdictions, it has
to be taken into account that the American and German systems of
corporate governance are still fundamentally different.'41
5.2. Important Changes to the Stock Corporation Act
During the last few years German stock corporation law has
undergone far-reaching changes which were achieved with a broad
parliamentary consensus. The international competitiveness of
Germany as a common industrial center and newly flourishing
financial market has been considerably improved with these new
laws. The major amendment in this context is the Business Control
and Transparency Act of 1998 (Gesetz zur Kontrolle im
Unternehmensbereich ("KonTraG")).142 This act is one of the most
140 § 174, AktG.
141 See therefore the landmark article of Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Culhral
Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to
Germany, 73 Tu.. L. REV. 69 (1998) [hereinafter Andre, Cultural Hegemony: The
Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany]; see alsa
Butler, supra note 125, at 555; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate
Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 CoLUm. J.
EuR. L. 219 (1999) (using the cases of the Deutsche Telekom privatization and the
merger of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz to argue that cross-border acquisition will
lead to a greater convergence of corporate governance systems); Helmut Kohl,
Path Dependence and German Corporate Law: Some Skeptical Remarks from the Sideline,
5 COLUmn. J. EuR. L. 189 (1999) (inquiring whether the Path Dependence theory
explains why certain German merchant and corporate laws continue to exist);
Dennis E. Logue & James K. Seward, Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The
Case of Daimler-Benz, 62 LAW & COI _mP. PROBS. 87 (1999) (using a case study of
Daimler-Benz to show the trend from communitarian to the contractarian system
of corporate governance); Edward B. Rock, America's Fascination with German
Corporate Governance, 40 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 219 (1995) (dealing with
the different perspectives of corporate governance).
142 See BUNDESGESErZBLATr (FEDERAL LAW GAZEFrrE) 1 786 (1998). See thereto in
English, Butler, supra note 125, at 559 (discussing the reasons behind the 1998
amendments to the Aktiengesetz). Regarding stock options, see Christian
Roschmann, Stock Options Plans in Germany, 12-SPG INT'L L PRACICUM-. 29 (1999).
Thereto in German, see for example, Peter Hommelhoff & Daniela Mattheus,
Corporate Governance nach dem KonTraG, 43 DIE AkmI.NGEsEu-scHAF [AG] 249
(1998); Bernhard Pellens, Andreas Bonse & Joachim Gassen, Perspkien der
deutschen Konzernrechnungslegung - Auswirlangen des Kapitalazfnalzncerleichtenmgs
gesetzes und des Gesetzes zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmenstareich, 51
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important amendments to the Stock Corporation Act in the last
decades. It has introduced many important changes, amending
internal control mechanisms, limiting the exercise of proxies by
banks, and introducing provisions on the issuance of stock options
to board members. The changes regarding the corporate
governance system were prompted by the failure of the
management board, the supervisory board, and auditors to
prevent spectacular collapses, and by discussions about the power
of banks in German stock corporations, due to their participation in
many corporations and their depository voting rights.143 Moreover
and interesting in this context, the German legislature, aware of the
progressing globalization of markets, intended to foster the
competitiveness of German companies and to open international
capital markets to German stock corporations. The KonTraG
amendments were envisioned as creating transparency and capital
market orientation, which is especially demonstrated by
liberalization of the provisions regarding the acquisition of the
corporation's own stocks.
5.3. Structuring Tracking Stock under the Stock Corporation Act
As stated previously, the Stock Corporation Act is an extremely
strict law. This principle is especially expressed in section 23(5) of
the AktG, which states that "[t]he articles of incorporation may
only contain provisions that deviate from those contained in the
Act when expressly permitted under the Act. Supplemental
provisions in the articles of association are permitted unless the
Act contains provisions that conclusively address such issues." 144
The consequence of this principle (Grundsatz der Satzungsstrenge) is
a deep restriction of the liberty to structure corporate transactions.
DER BETRIEB [DB] 785 (1998). For an excellent discussion about corporate
governance in Germany within an international comparison, see CARSTEN BERRAR,
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DEUTSCHLAND IM
INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH (2001) [hereinafter BERRAR, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DEUTSCHLAND IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICI-H].
143 See, for example, the comprehensive overview on that German
phenomena, Andre, Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate
Governance Ideologies to Germany, supra note 141, at 127-46; Butler, supra note 125, at
560,572-75.
144 § 23(5), AktG.
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Moreover, a tracking stock structure that violates section 23(5) of
the AktG is likely to be totally invalid.1 45
5.3.1. Dividend Rights
The most important monetary right is the right to receive
dividends. The German stock corporation is characterized by the
principle of maintenance of the capital (Gnndsatz der
Kapitalerhaltung), which leads to several restrictions for the
distribution of dividends and will be discussed soon below. Many
lawyers see herein the most serious concern against a tracking
stock culture in Germany. The statutory regime of maintenance of
the capital triggers in this context primarily two questions: (1)
whether the payment of dividends may be legally linked in the
articles to the performance of a particular business unit;, and (2)
how the financial outcome in the core business or other segments
influences the ability of the company to distribute dividends to the
holder of tracking stock. The latter question raises the
supplemental issue of how restrictions of the Stock Corporation
Act regarding the distribution of dividends can be compensated
through additional features.
5.3.1.1. The Modification of the Distnibution of Profits
A crucial point to establish a tracking stock culture is the
distribution of profits to the different classes of shareholders in the
charter. Commonly the dividends of the shareholder of a stock
corporation correspond with their share capita 1 46 According to
section 60(1) of the AktG the shareholders participate in the profits
of the stock corporation in proportion to their holdings in the share
145 However, the legal consequences of the violation of section 23(5) of the
AktG are still not sufficiently settled; see, for example, the discussion by UwE
HOFE, ATimENGESErZ KO.MMErNTAR § 23 margin no. 43 (4th ed. 1999); KArEN
SCHI-DT, GROBKOmENTAR AKTIENGESETZ § 241 margin no. 56,60 (IKaus J. Hopt &
Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. 1996).
146 The AktG puts great emphasis on the integrity of the stated share capital.
According to section 1 of the AktG, the stock corporation has to have a stated
share capital (Grundkapita divided into shares. This means that the Grundkapilal
must be divided into different and at least two shares. The number of shares it is
divided into must be mentioned in the articles of incorporation. Assume, for
instance, that a stock corporation has a stated capital of EURO 100,000 and 100
shares; then every share has a share capital of EURO 100.
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capital.147 At first glance, the idea of tracking stock violates this
provision because its right to the dividends is not linked to the
proportion in the stock capital, but only to the performance of the
tracked segment. Nonetheless, section 60(3) of the AktG allows an
exemption for the case that the corporation's charter provides for
another method of payment. 48 It is settled that this leeway is wide
enough to link the dividends of shares to the financial performance
of a distinct business segment, subsidiary, or revenue stream.149
Because the shares confer different rights with respect to the
distribution of profits and corporate assets, the tracking stocks
contribute, according to section 11 of the AktG,150 a particular class
of shares.151 Under German corporate law, however, unequal
treatment of shareholders is always an issue which should not be
underestimated. As a general unwritten constitution of German
corporate law, all shareholders shall be treated equally by the
corporation under equivalent circumstances. This is explicitly
aligned by section 53a of the AktG.152 However, this direction is
not so restrictive as it seems. Reasonable modifications of the
principle of equal treatment are permissible.'5 3 The Act shows by
itself that some modifications are acceptable. The Act authorizes in
sections 60(3) and 271(3) of the AktG to treat shareholders
differently regarding the distribution of dividends and assets, 154
and section 11 of the AktG constitutes different classes of
shareholders. 55 Especially, section 11 of the AktG demonstrates
that even under the Stock Corporation Act shareholders provided
with different rights can be treated differently. 5 6 The principle of
equal treatment in general is not up to the disposition of the
147 § 60(1), AktG.
148 § 60(3), AktG.
149 Baums, Spartenorganisation, "Tracking Stock" und deutsches Aktienrecht,
supra note 35, at 29-30; Brauer, supra note 119, at 325; Mifller, supra note 119, at 58.
150 § 11, AktG.
151 Brauer, supra note 119, at 326.
152 § 53, AktG.
153 HOFFER, supra note 145, § 53a margin no. 5; MARCUS LUTrER, KOLNER
KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, at § 53a margin no. 22 and 28 (Wolfgang Zbllner
ed., 2d ed. 1988); Brauer, supra note 119, at 332
154 §§ 60(3), 271(3), AktG.
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corporation, but the reference of comparison can be modified. At
least the shareholder is in the position to waive his right of equal
treatment, for instance when he participates in the approval of
unequal distribution of dividends to the benefit of other
shareholders. 57 In sum, to link the dividends of tracking stock to
the performance of the underlying business unit in the articles of
incorporation or in other corporate provisions is basically
permissible and does not conflict with the principle of equal
treatment of shareholders s5
5.3.1.2. The Influence of the Outconte in the Core Business
The last paragraph consequently leads to the issue of how the
corporation has to apply this dividend policy provided by the
articles. The management board of the German stock corporation,
according to sections 242 and 264(1) of the General Commercial
Code (Handelsgesetzbuch/HGB),5 9 is responsible for the creation of
the annual financial statements and the management report. Upon
completion, the management board shall promptly submit the
documents to the supervisory board.160 The annual financial
statements shall be deemed to have been approved upon
acceptance thereof by the supervisory board161.162 To the extent
that the shareholders' meeting is not responsible for it, the
stockholders are bound by the establishment of the annual
accounts by the management board and supervisory board. This
procedure of approval of annual financial statements is
differentiated from the appropriation of profits, which is assigned
to the shareholders' meeting.163 The stockholders in any event
retain control over the allocation of the balance sheet profits.
157 HD='ER, supra note 145, § 53a margin no. 5; LUTTER, supra note 153, § 53a
margin no. 29,30.
15s THiEL, SPARTENAKrIEN, supra note 7, at 232; Brauer, supra note 119, at 332-
33.
159 Handelsgesetzbuch [Generell Commercial Code] of v. 05.10.1897 (RGB1.
S. 219) (BGB1. 1114100-1), last changed through the Act of 030.2000 (BGB1. I
S. 330) [hereinafter HGB].
160 § 170(1), AktG.
161 § 172(2), AktG.
162 The management board and the supervisory board, however, can resolve
that the annual reports be established by the shareholders meeting. § 172, AktG.
163 § 174, AktG.
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However, according to sections 57(3) and 58(4) of the AktG,
dividends may be distributed only from the balance sheet profit
(Bilanzgewinn) and only to the extent that the distribution of the
profit to the shareholders has not been excluded pursuant to the
articles or by resolution of the shareholders' meeting.164 Any
distributions going beyond the balance sheet profit or otherwise
determined expenditure may be made only after liquidation of the
company.165
The shareholder's monetary right to obtain dividends initially
means only that the shareholders' meeting is required to resolve
the appropriation of profits, 66 but the entitlement to receive
dividend payments accrues only after the resolution is passed. For
instance, a resolution of the stockholders' meeting or of the
management board, together with the supervisory board, can
require the allocation of the respective balance sheet profit to the
reserves of the company or a resolution of the shareholders'
meeting can carry such amounts forward.167 Consequently, even if
the company gained a surplus it does not legally mean that the
shareholders are entitled to receive dividends.
Like the legal outcome under Delaware law, it is also the case
in the German stock corporation that dividends are solely payable
out of those funds of the corporation that are legally available.
Section 58(4) of the AktG makes undoubtedly clear that the
shareholders only are entitled to the receipt of net retained
profits-and that such profits can moreover be excluded from
distribution by law, the articles of association, or a resolution of the
shareholders' meeting.168 There is also no doubt that the Stock
Corporation Act refers to the retained profits of the entire company
and not of several business segments.169  Therefore, a stock
164 §§ 57(3), 58(4), AktG.
16 The violation of this principle of maintenance of the capital triggers
massive civil liability. According to section 62(1) of the AktG, shareholders shall
repay the stockholders for any benefit they have received from the firm contrary
to the provisions of the Act. Moreover, according to sections 93(3) and 116 of the
AktG, the management board and the supervisory board can be held liable to the
extent they have violated the provisions for the protections of the company assets.
166 §§119(1) Nr. 2,174, AktG.
167 See §§ 58(2)-(3), 174, AktG.
168 § 58(4), AktG.
169 Baums, Spartenorganisation, "Tracking Stock" und deutsches Aktienrechit,
supra note 35, at 29.
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corporation cannot pay a dividend on tracking stock, even though
the business unit, for instance doing business in an extremely
profitable digital broadcasting service, is fabulously successful, if
the company as a whole has no net profits.1 70 Then, the income of
tracking stock holders consists of only potential increases in the
price of the shares. This shows that, although the business
segments in a tracking stock culture are treated economically on a
stand-alone basis, as far as the payments of dividends are
concerned, their legal and financial roots cannot be cut entirely.
Only if the company as a whole performs well and gains net
profits will there be funds legally available to distribute as
dividends and to link to the performance of the particular tracked
business segments. High earnings in the profit center can lead
then to equivalent high dividends, whereas in times in which the
tracked segment fails to generate earnings it is precluded from
dividends, even if the company as a whole has performed very
profitably and earned a fund legally available for the payment of
dividends. But that is not necessary. As long as funds are legally
available, the company can be entitled to transfer profits from a
successful to a less successful business segment.171 It is imaginable,
for instance, that the shareholders' meeting permits the
management board payment of dividends on every class up to
legally available amounts; i.e., the profitability is just one element
in the dividend policy of the management board.
5.3.1.3. Dividend Preferences
The question is whether there is any option to relax this strict
regime of maintenance of capital under sections 57(3) and 58(4) of
the AktG to the benefit of the holder of tracking stock2j A look at
the rights of preference shareholders without votes under the Stock
Corporation Act gives some support.l' 3  Many articles of
incorporation of German stock corporations provide, in analogy to
170 Mailer, supra note 119, at 59; Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracing Stock, supra
note 119, at 395.
'71 The often used German terminology for a transfer from a profitable
segment to a less successful segment is "Quersubenlion."
172 See §§ 57(3), 58(4), AktG.
17 See §§ 139-141, AktG.
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section 140(2) of the AktG,174 that in the case that a preference
dividend is not paid or is not paid in full in any given year and if
the amount in arrears is not paid in the next year together with the
full preference dividend for such year, the holders of preference
shares have a right to receive dividends prior to all other
shareholders ("cumulative preference").175  In other words,
cumulative preference means that in the event of a dividend being
passed, it accumulates and must be paid before the dividends of
common stock. Although technically quite difficult to structure,
there is no concern that such a method of distribution can legally
be implemented in the articles of incorporation of a tracking stock
corporation.176  Consequently, the fact that a tracking stock
dividend is not paid equivalent to the performance of the tracked
unit gives rise to a claim for any tracking stock dividend due which
is contingent upon later resolution regarding the distribution of
profits. If one business segment causes overall loss, shares tracking
the profitable business segment have the priority to catch up
dividends when payments resume.
174 At this point, the American reader might ask whether preferred stock
could not directly be the appropriate way to provide German tracking
stockholders with additional dividend rights. Indeed, it is essential to
differentiate "preferred shares" under U.S. law and "preference shares" under
German corporate law. §§ 139-141, AktG. Both are a class of stock giving its
holder a preferential claim to dividends and to corporate assets upon liquidation
but that "usually" carry no voting rights. However, whereas the denial of voting
rights under Delaware law is discretionary under Delaware General Corporation
Law § 212(a), which states, "[u]nless otherwise provided..., each stockholder shall be
entitled to vote for each share of capital stock held by such stockholder," (emphasis
added) German preference shares have, according to section 139 of the AktG,
basically no voting rights-except in the case of section 140(2) of the AktG.
175 See TiLMAN BEZZENBERGER, VORZUGSAKTIEN OHNE STIMMRECHT 44 (1991); see
also Theodor Baums & Matthias M6ller, Venture Capital: U.S.-amerikanisches Modell
und deutsches Aktienrecht, in CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE
LAW. LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD M. BUXBAUM 33,43-44 (Theodor Baums et al. eds.,
2000) (discussing cumulative preferences and their application in the venture
capital context); Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock, supra note 119, at 395
(affirming the permissibility of cumulative preferences in a tracking stock
corporation).
176 Baums, Spartenorganisation, "Tracking Stock" und deutsches Aktienrecht,
supra note 35, at 29-30; Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock, supra note 119, at 395.
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5.3.1.4. Issuance of Participation Rights
In publicly held companies, the compensation of previous
failures in dividends with later balance sheet incomes might
frequently be a sufficient method to guarantee the financial
interests of the holders of tracking stock. However, the approach
will often lead to a loss in net present value and will be absolutely
worthless if the company has a negative forecast and is for a longer
time not able to gain a distributable balance sheet profit. The
issuance of participation rights is an interesting feature used to
separate the ability to pay dividends to tracking stock from the
existence of a balance sheet income in this context. According to
section 221(3) of the AktG, the corporation may issue participation
rights on the basis of a resolution of the shareholders
(Genuflrechte).177 Like convertible bonds or bonds with warrants,
participation rights are securities and may be issued in the form of
certificates. A participation right entitles the holder to certain
benefits but does not grant any ownership rights.j78 Such benefits
include participation in profits or participation in remaining assets
after liquidation. The leeway of structuring participation rights is
very broad and thus allows the linking of their yields to the
performance of a particular business unit.179 Because participation
rights certificates are merely a contractual claim against the stock
corporation and not a corporate right similar to the position of a
shareholder, the strict dividend restrictions of the stock
corporation do not apply.1S 0 Therefore, in contrast to tracking
stock, participation rights can basically confer the right to receive
dividends even though the entire company has no balance sheet
profitsi s'
According to the underlying premise of this Article, however,
tracking stock is a class of common stock and therefore belongs to
the equity of the parent corporation. This conclusion leads first to
177 § 221(3), AktG.
178 See Judgment of November 9, 1992, BGHZ 120, 141(146-147); GONhr
HENN, HANDBUCH DES AKrINREcHTS § 36 margin no. 1294 (6th ed. 1993).
179 See MARcus LUTrER, in 5 K0LNER KOMMENTAR ZUtM AKHTENESETZ § 221
margin no. 208 (Wolfgang Z611ner ed., 2d ed. 1995); Mfiller, supra note 119, at 60.
1S0 §§ 57(3), 58(4), AktG.
181 LurrER, supra note 179, § 221 margin no. 201. However, in praxis usually
the payment of dividends to participation rights depends on the existence of any
balance sheet profits. See id. § 221 margin no. 210.
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the absolutely unsettled question under German corporate law of
whether participation rights can be structured in a manner similar
to equity. Whereas some scholars deny equity structured
participation rights due an alleged illegal bypass of the provisions
of preference stock, 182 others emphasize the historical intention of
the legislature to provide the economy with flexible features to
raise corporate funds.183  The Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof/BGH), Germany's highest court for civil causes,
has not yet decided this question.184 In any case, as long as German
courts do not establish a secure guideline on this matter, firms will
continue to be reluctant in issuing equity structured participation
rights.
Second, regardless of the equity question, participation rights
lack important administrative features required to become
equivalent to tracking stock.185 German law principally reserves
some original rights exclusively to shareholders that contractually
cannot be assigned to third parties. This exclusion especially
encompasses the right to vote,186 to call a shareholders' meeting,187
or on actions to set aside resolutions of the shareholders'
meeting'88 ,189 whereas holders of participation rights, for example,
182 §§ 139-141, AktG; see, e.g., Mathias Habersack, Genzf3rechte und
sorgfaltswidrige Geschiftsfiihrung, 155 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT
UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 378,385-86 (1991); Heribert Hirte, Genuflscheine mit
Eigenkapitalkharakter in der Aktiengesellschaft, 9 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT
[ZIP] 477, 478 (1988); Dieter Reuter, Genufl ohne Reue?, 30 DIE AKiENGESELLsCHAFr
[AG] 104,104-05 (1985).
183 HOFFER, supra note 145, § 221 margin no. 34; Horst Hammen,
Unzuldssigkeit aktiengleicher Genuflrechte?, 41 DER BETRIEB [DB] 2549, 2553 (1988);
Uwe H. Schneider, Genufirechte an Konzernunternehmen, in 65 BILANZ- UND
KONZERNREcHT, FEsrscIHRIFT ZUM. GEBURTSTAG VON DR. DR. H. C. REINHARD
GOERDELER 511, 513-14 (Hans Havermann ed., 1987); Roll Sethe, Genuiflrechte:
Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen und Anlegerschutz (I), 38 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
[AG] 293,307 (1993).
184 See the landmark decision "Kl6ckner-Genilsse" of October 5, 1992, BGHZ
119,305 (311-12).
185 See, e.g., Mfiller, supra note 119, at 60.
186 § 134, AktG.
187 §§ 121-122, AktG.
188 §§ 243-248, AktG.
189 See Judgment of October 5, 1992, BGHZ 119, 305(316-17); HOFFER, supra
note 145, § 221 margin no. 26; LUTrER, supra note 179, § 221, margin no. 219. But
see also Lothar Vollmer & Bernhard Lorch, Der Schutz des aktienfiihnlichen
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can only be entitled to several information rights.is This
recognition leads to the assumption that participation rights
provided by the Stock Corporation can basically not substitute a
financial tool like tracking stock; rather, they can only serve as a
monetary appendix of tracking stock to ensure that a positive
performance of a tracked business segment, even in times without
overall-profits, leads to corresponding dividends. However, in this
case the company has to issue both tracking stock and participation
rights, which makes the structure even much more complicated
than it already is.
Indeed, it has to be taken into account that the above
conclusion is predetermined by the underlying definition of this
elaboration that tracking stock is a part of equity. Therefore,
depending on the investor's objectives, it is not a compulsory right
that participation rights cannot provide a substitute item for
tracking stock. Rather, if the investor is focused on just holding a
security in which yields are linked to the performance of a distinct
business segment and she or he further does not care about other
administrative and monetary rights which equity usually confers,
participation rights might match her or his objectives absolutely.
From the company's perspective, the question of capital structure
is raised, that is the mix of equity and debt by which the firm most
efficiently finances its operations. Corporate finance theories
provide general applications to figure out the proper ratio of debt
to equity for every individual firm. Consideration of the above-
discussed typical tracking stock transactions, however, shows that
tracking stock usually has to be equity to potentialize the desired
unique benefits of this financial tool. The topic "unlock hidden
value" is connected with the expectation that tracking stock has the
potential to avoid a conglomerate discount and thereby increase
the firm's market value. But, in order to allow the issue to
unbundle the business for the purpose of selling its parts without
having to separate the operations, tracking stock must naturally be
equity. The employment of tracking stock as an M&A currency,
like in the GM case, usually also necessitates equity to accomplish
an exchange tender offer or a merger because the target
Genuflkapitals bei Kapital-erfinderungen, 4 ZEnSCHIFT FOR BANXRECHT UND
BANKviRTscHAFr [ZBB] 44,46-47,49-50 (1992).
190 HOFFER, supra note 145, § 221 margin no. 26; LtrrrE, supra note 179, § 221,
margin no. 220.
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shareholders want to maintain their economic and legal status.
Eventually, the use of tracking stock as an employment
consideration needs equity as well because the underlying idea is
to make the management into owners of the firm in order to reduce
agency costs. What remains for debt structured participation
rights is a means to raise corporate funds. However, the
outstanding and interesting benefits embodied by tracking stock,
such as the creation of separate public equity securities while
preserving certain advantages of remaining a consolidated entity,
are then lost.
5.3.1.5. Preliminary Conclusion
As already pointed out, German lawyers recognize that, in the
strict regime of maintenance of capital under sections 57(3) and
58(4) of the Stock Corporation Act, one of the highest barriers is to
establish a tracking stock culture. This statement is not convincing.
It is true that the stock corporation is legally prevented from
paying dividends to the holders of tracking stock if the entire firm
did not gain a balance sheet profit. Even a fabulously successful
business segment does not entitle dividend payments when the
other profit centers have a negative performance and clear away
the outcome in the tracked unit. However, the outcome of the legal
analysis of the German rights to dividends in the stock corporation
does not differ from the situation in the United States. In fact,
under Delaware corporate law, the corporations cannot pay a
dividend on tracking stock if the company as a whole has no
surplus or net profits, even though the business unit is
spectacularly flourishing.'9' This issue alone has never prevented
Wall Street lawyers and investment bankers from introducing
tracking stock in an American company. Moreover, the
appropriation of annual net income under the Stock Corporation
Act can be modified with a catch-up feature; for example, if the
remaining business segment causes overall loss, shares tracking the
profitable business segment have the priority to catch up
dividends when payments resume. Eventually it should be
contemplated to combine tracking stock with participation rights
to guarantee holders of tracking stock that a positive outcome of
191 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 170(a) (1991).
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the tracked unit, even in times without overall profits, will always
lead to corresponding dividends.
5.3.2. Liquidation Rights
According to section 271(1) of the AktG, any assets of the stock
corporation remaining after the discharge of all its liabilities shall
be distributed among the shareholders.19 2 Section 271(2)193 of the
Act states parallel to section 60(1)194 in that the assets shall be
distributed in proportion to the share capital held by each
shareholder. However, as far as shares with different rights
regarding the stock corporation's assets exist, another provision in
the charter is legally possible.1 95 This enables the company to
design the charter according to the requirements of tracking stock,
i.e., to grant for instance liquidation preferences.196
It is important to note that the discussion of liquidation rights
is academic, rather than a matter of upcoming practices, since the
economic significance of liquidation rights to the holder of tracking
stock is wholly dependent on the likelihood that the corporation
may in fact liquidate.197 The possibility of insolvency or liquidation
due voluntary reasons is, for the most quoted stock corporations in
Germany, so remote that the market would not take it into account
for evaluation; however, with respect to a start-up company listed
an the German innovation exchange (Neuer Markt)193 the
probability of liquidation may be and is more real.
192 § 271(1), AktG.
193 §271(2), AktG.
'94 § 60(1), AktG.
195 See HOFFER, supra note 145, § 271 margin no. 2; Baums & M61ler, supra note
175, at53; Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional slares, supra note 119, at 1283.
196 THEL, SPARTENAKTEN, supra note 7, at 236-37; Brauer, supra note 119, at
325.
197 For the German discussion, see Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional
shares, supra note 119, at 1283. For the American discussion, see Dahlberg & Perry,
Tracking Stock: Virtual Equity, Virtual Entities, and Virtual Mergers and Acquisitions,
supra note 5, at 249.
193 The "Neuer Markt" is the German equivalent of the American NASDAQ.
The "Neuer Markt" was designed by the Deutsche B6rse AG to attract mainly
high technology "growth" stocks satisfying selected governance criteria and
intended to appeal to international investors. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan,
Regulatory Competition in Intenational Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in
1999-Part 1, 56 Bus. LAW. 653, 679-80 (2001).
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5.3.3. Voting Rights
The most important administrative right of a shareholder is the
voting right pursuant to section 134 of the AktG199 because it
enables him or her to influence the stock corporation on those
matters that fall within the competence of the shareholders'
meeting. It is a principle of the stock corporation that each share
confers the right to vote in proportion to its par value.200 Like the
analysis under American law there are basically no differences
between the voting rights of tracking stock and voting rights of
common stock. The right to vote proportionally to nominal value
or number of shares applies equally to tracking stock and other
common stockholders. 201 Also, tracking stockholders in a stock
corporation do not have special voting rights regarding the tracked
assets or businesses.
5.3.3.1. Class Voting
Usually the holder of tracking stock and common stock vote
together in a single class.202 However, in fundamental corporate
changes, the Stock Corporation Act provides mandatory class
voting. According to section 179(1) of the AktG, any amendment
of the articles requires the approval, by resolution, of the
shareholders' meeting.203 Unless the articles provide otherwise,
section 179(2) of the AktG entails that these shareholders
resolutions must be passed by a majority of three-quarters of the
stated capital presented at the meeting.204  If the existing
relationship between classes of shares is to be amended to the
disadvantage of any class of stock, the resolution of the
shareholders' meeting shall, pursuant to section 179(3) of the
AktG,205 require the consent of the adversely affected shareholders,
representing three-quarters of the capital of this class, in order to
199 § 134, AktG.
200 §§ 12(1), 134, AktG.
201 Thus, if tracking stock and common stock of different par values have
been issued, a common stock share having a par value of EURO 100 represents
twice the voting power of a EURO 50 par value tracking stock share.
202 Brauer, supra note 119, at 328.
203 § 179(1), AktG.
204 § 179(2), AktG.
205 § 179(3), AktG.
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become effective (Sonderbeschlujf).X6 Since, according to section 11
of the AktG,207 common stock and tracking stock also constitute
different classes under German corporate law, any amendments to
the articles that do not affect holders of tracking stock and holders
of common stock equally or that place additional obligations or
burdens on these individual classes require the three-quarters
approval of those affected.2m For instance, this is the case if the
definition of the core business in the articles should be changed to
the disadvantage of the tracked business unit. Such resolution
shall be adopted either at a separate meeting of the concerned
shareholders or by a separate vote.209
5.3.3.2. Floating Voting
As already shown, in the majority of the American tracking
stock corporations voting rights are subject to periodic adjustments
based on relative market values. This floating system claims to
prevail over fixed voting rights because it complies with the legal
and economical reasoning that the power of voting should
correspond to the value of the investment of each shareholder.
However, even under Delaware corporate law, the floating voting
system is the subject of serious legal concerns because as the
relative market capitalization of each class stock naturally changes,
the holder of shares of the different classes become an unequal
number of votes per share. Whereas the legal analysis under
Delaware is uncertain, the outcome under the German Stock
Corporation Act is absolutely clear: Each share confers without
exception one vote and, according to section 12(1)(i) of the AktGA3"
multiple voting rights (Mehrfachstinnrechte) are prohibitedXf This
206 See Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock, supra note 119, at 392. Class
voting is also provided, for example, when there are changes in status of
preference shareholders, section 141(3) of the AktG, capital increases for
contributions, section 182(2) of the AktG, or ordinary capital reductions, section
222(2) of the AktG.
207 § 11, AktG.
2M Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock, supra note 119, at 392.
209 § 138, AktG.
210 § 12(1)(i), AktG.
211 Section 134(ii), AktG allows only for a stock corporation whose shares are
not listed on a stock exchange that the articles of incorporation may limit the
voting rights of shareholders owning more than one share by setting a maximum
amount of the share capital or a sliding scale (Hddiststimmredite). For the previous
200]]
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restriction was introduced in 1998 through the KonTraG. Before
then it was at least possible to get a governmental exception in
order to safeguard overriding interests of the public welfare. 212
Thus, right now it is not possible to implement a floating voting
system in a stock corporation.2 3 Nonetheless, there is a rumor that
the German Legislator (Deutscher Bundestag) is reviewing the
voting rights under the Stock Corporation Act to allow again
multiple voting rights under special circumstances. 214
5.3.3.3. Cumulative Voting
Most U.S. state laws, like those of Delaware, authorize
corporations to adopt cumulative voting for director elections, and
some federal laws (such as those governing public utilities) require
it. Cumulative voting is the privilege of multiplying the number of
shares held by the number of directors to be elected and casting the
product for a single candidate or distributing the product among
two or more candidates.215 This device is intended to accord board
representation to minority shareholder interests by enhancing the
ability of the minority shareholders to elect at least one director.
Thus, in the tracking stock context, shareholders surely could place
at least one person on the board who is dedicated to representing
legal situation in Germany, see Andr6, Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of
Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, supra note 141, at 166-68.
Hchststimmrechte might be structured, e.g., in the way that the first 100.000
EURO of par value carry full voting rights, the second 100.000 EURO half of the
normal rights, and shares in excess of 200.000 EURO par value do not confer any
voting rights.
212 See Andr6, Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate
Governance Ideologies to Germany, supra note 141, at 168-70.
213 JAEGER, TARGETED STOCK ALS RFsrRUKTURIERUNGSINSTRUMENT, supra note
118, at 222; Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at
1283; Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock, supra note 119, at 396.
214 See Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at
1283.
215 For the outstanding overview of cumulative voting and its impact in the
different American jurisdictions, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions As Relational
Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 124 (1994); see also
Theodor Baums, General Meetings in Listed Companies-New Challenges and
Opportunities, in: Company Law Reform in OECD COUNTRIES-A COMPARATIVE
OUTLOOK OF CURRENT TRENDS, Dec. 7-8, 2000 available at http://www.oecd.org
/daf/corporate-affairs/govemance/company-law/in-oecd-countries/baums.pdf,
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their interests. With cumulative voting, however, each stock has as
many votes as vacancies to be filled; one vote is not cast for each of
the vacant positions. For this reason, German stock corporation
law does not permit cumulative voting. Each election of a director
is considered independent because each involves a complete
shareholder vote. This process involves more than just the
appointment of the entire board. Rather, there are as many
corporate decisions to be made as there are directors to be
chosen.2' 6 To argue that the cumulative vote outcome of the
election is the only aspect that matters is to disregard this structure
of shareholder voting. In the end, cumulative voting is just an
impermissible modification of multiple voting rights.X 7
5.4. Corporate Governance Issues
The impact of the implementation of tracking stock on
corporate governance under German corporate law is basically the
same as under Delaware corporate law. The legal structure of
management and supervision does not change.ms  The
management board is still responsible for the management of the
entire stock corporationX 9 The management board retains full
operating control of all tracked business groups and only a single
supervisory board sits for the entire corporation=2 a A separate
management or supervisory board related to each individual class
of stock does not legally exist. Only the single management board
is responsible for ensuring compliance with the legal requirements
216 This is not necessarily due to any lack of concern with minority
shareholders, but instead is a sort of reflection of the existence of a whole separate
body of German law (called the Concern Law) dedicated to protecting minority
shareholders. Some German stock corporations provide so named global voting
concerning the members of the supervisory board; i.e., the shareholders can only
reject or approve the list of directors which is provided by the management of the
corporation. In these cases, however, cumulative voting makes no sense at all,
because minority shareholders have only the ability to agree or to disagree instead
of having the opportunity to concentrate all votes on their favored director.
217 Another opinion is that of Carsten Berrar, Die Zustimnmngspfliditigen
Gescdiifte nach § 111 Abs. 4 AktG int Lidrte der jfilngsten Corporate Governance
Diskussion, 4 NEUE ZEITSCH=r FOR GESELLSCHAFTSREC=T [NZG] (forthcoming
Nov. 2001).
218 Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisionl shares, supra note 119, at 1283-
84.
219 § 76, AktG.
220 § 111, AktG.
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within the group and to ensure their observations by the business
segments themselves.
Indeed, it is also likely in a German stock corporation that an
issuance of tracking stock would potentially create conflicts among
the multiple groups of shareholders because they are usually
provided with different legal rights and are concerned with
different financial interests. The board faces potential conflicts of
interest in reconciling demands of several business and several
shareholder bases. Thus, it is essential to determine the legal
means of safeguarding the rights of tracking stockholders through
mandatory or facultative rules under the German Stock
Corporation Act. First of all, it is important to assure the portfolio
of the different business segments. Then the question arises as to
how far shareholders can participate in the management decision-
making process beyond the explicit voting provisions of the AktG,
i.e., whether shareholders can be granted more matters on which
they can vote. This proves how shareholders can at least influence
decisions of the management board and supervisory board.
Further, the management's responsibility under German law will
be scrutinized. Eventually, the role of the supervisory board comes
into play.
5.4.1. Determination of the Business Segments and Management
Guidelines
In order to guarantee the rights of the holders of tracking stock,
the portfolio of the particular segments, the allocations between
them, and the entire standing in the conglomerate have to be
defined in an obliging manner. The shareholders must know in
advance to which assets their stocks are "virtually" linked and
must be ensured that this allocation is not up to the discretion of
the management board. Indeed, the divisional organization of the
corporation is encompassed by the comprehensive power of the
management board pursuant to section 76(1) of the AktG.221
Unless a management board member has been granted sole
management authority, the members are only entitled to manage
the company jointly.222 The rights and duties of the management
board members are normally regulated in internal rules
221 § 76(1), AktG.
222 § 77(1), AktG.
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(Geschaftsordnung) which especialy address the allocation of
responsibilities among the management board members and rules
on the board's voting. Therefore, it is legally possible to assign an
individual member of the management board with the
responsibility of managing a tracked business unit2n3 However,
this delegation may not impair the general decision-making
authority of the entire management board granted by section 76(1)
of the AktG.224
The management board itself may establish rules, if the articles
do not provide them, that only the supervisory board may
establish the internal rules or the supervisory board may not do
so.m22 According to section 77(2)(ii) of the AktG,226 the articles of
incorporation may contain binding provisions that govern specific
matters regarding the rules of procedure. The sections give
thereby-as under Delaware corporate law-the legal basis to
adopt a prophylactic measure for management in a tracking stock
company to handle conflicts among the several classes of
shareholders and to direct the involvement of the management
board in advance, for instance the definition of the director's duties
and disclosure aspects. 227  This also includes particular
management decisions, especially the definition of the portfolios of
the different segments.228  In that case the management is
prevented from restructuring the determination of the business
segments without shareholder approval. The internal rules can
also provide for committees to which the management board can
assign certain duties.229  In the tracking stock context such
committees may give further support in managing the tracked
assets and resolving inter-group conflicts.
223 Schiessl, supra note 119, at 67.
224 See id.
2 § 77(2)(i), AktG.
M § 77(2)(ii), AktG.
22V Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock, supra note 119, at 394; sce also THIEL,
SPARTENAKTIEN, supra note 7, at 222-24.
2N Baums, Spartenorganisalion, "Tracking Stack" und deulsces Aklienredzl,
supra note 35, at 30-31.
229 Schiessl, supra note 119, at 77-82; Sieger & Hasselbach, Trading Stack, supra
note 119, at 394.
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5.4.2. Unwritten Shareholder Vote in Material Transactions
(Holzmiiller Doctrine)
Section 138(i) of the AktG permits, according to its language,
the implementation of separate resolutions of certain shareholders,
i.e., class voting, in the articles of incorporation. 230 However,
because of the strict character of the Stock Corporation Act
expressed by section 23(5) of the AktG,231 this provision has no
practical effect. In particular, the system of corporate governance
here is very rigorous. To grant the shareholders the exclusive right
to decide about the effectiveness of a transaction regarding assets of
a tracked business unit complies in no case with the system of the
stock corporation because, according to section 76(1) of the
AktG232 only the management board is responsible for running the
corporation. The wholesale delegation of the day-to-day
management responsibilities to the shareholders' meeting is
prohibited; rather, the management board may only present the
shareholders' management matters to prevent personal
liability 233.234 So the management board determines the details of
management, even though the real power lies with the supervisory
board and the shareholders' meeting, especially when both are
dominated by majority shareholders.
Although the shareholders' meeting is, according to the Stock
Corporation Act, not entitled to interfere with the management of
the corporation unless the management board asks for its decision
or approval pursuant to section 119(2) of the AktG,235 the
Bundesgerichtshof has held in the landmark case "Holzmfiller" that
the management board nonetheless must ask for shareholder
approval in instances where the rights or interests of shareholders
may be infringed.236 If a transaction is regarded to be vitally
2o § 138(i), AktG.
231 § 23(5), AktG.
232 § 76(1), AktG.
M" § 119(2), AktG.
234 See, e.g., Baums & M611er, supra note 175, at 67.
m § 119(2), AktG.
236 See Judgment of February 25, 1982 BGHZ 83, 122. In this case the
management board (Vorstand) planned to transfer a part of the business to a
subsidiary. Id. For an excellent description in English language, see Joachim
Rosengarten, The Holzmfiller Doctrine: Still Crazy after All These Years? - The Impact
of a Doctrine in the Days of Mergers of Equals, in CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS
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important for the overall structure, approval of the shareholders'
meeting is required ("Holzmiiller doctrine"). The case is therefore
so important because the Bundesgeficdtslwf granted shareholders,
for the first time, rights beyond of the provisions of the Stock
Corporation Act. It is a real caselaw extension of shareholder
rights to vote on all fundamental corporate transactions, and it
complies with American standards to find the law rather than with
the common style of interpretation of provisions under German
law. The decision further gives to individual shareholders a
derivative action against acts of the management board which,
through valid and binding relationships with third parties, infringe
upon the rights of the shareholders' meeting. 7  If such
transactions have been consummated, the stockholder may sue for
a declaratory judgment that the management exceeded the limits
of its authorization and must endeavor to restore the previous
condition. If the transaction has not been consummated yet, the
stockholder may have the right to obtain a court injunction.
According to this caselaw, it is obvious that the underlying
reasoning could also apply to transactions in a tracking stock
corporation. It is indeed likely that courts would require
shareholders' approval, although not provided by the provisions of
the Stock Corporation Act, if the corporation transfers an essential
portion of assets from one business segment to another within the
firm or to a third party. 38 The sale of the entire business unit
would certainly be regarded as an essential transaction within the
meaning of the aforementioned Bundesgerichtslof case.
AND BusINEss IN THE LAW: LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD M. BuxBAUM 445-460 (Theodor
Baums et al. eds., 2000).
237 Judgment of February 25, 1982 BGHZ 83, 122 (126, 134). Especially in
comparison with the American shareholder derivative suit, see Gerd Krieger,
Aktiondrsklage zur Kontrolle des Vorstands- und Aufsidzisratshandelns, 163
ZEITSCHIFr FOR DAS GESAirE HANDELSRECHT UND VVIRTSCHARSRECHT [ZHR] 343
(1999); Eckart Stinner, Aktionfrrsklage zur Kontrolle des Vorstands- und
Aufsichtsratshandelns - Audh vor den Hintergrund der US-Edrizhrngen mit dem
Shareholder Derivative Suit 163 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESA1ffE HANDELSRECHT UND
WiRTscHAFrsREcHT [ZHRI 364 (1999); Peter Ulmer, Die Aktionfirsklage als
Instrument zur Kontrolle des Vorstands- und Auifsidzisraslhandelns - Vor dent
Hintergrund der US-Erfahrungen mit der sharelolders' derivative aclion, 163
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR DAS GESAIWE HANDELSRECHT UND VIRSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 290
(1999).
m Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at 1281,
1283.
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Unfortunately, and this is still one of the unsolved problems of the
Stock Corporation Act, nobody knows exactly at which levels the
terms "transfer of a significant portion of assets," "vitally
important for the overall structure," or "instances where the rights
or interests of shareholders may be infringed" triggers the
requirement of shareholders' approval. Moreover and
unfortunately, whether a Holzmifiller approval requires an
ordinary fifty percent majority or a supermajority of seventy-five
percent of the votes cast is absolutely uncertain. The prevailing
interpretation of the Holzmueller judgment presumes that a
majority of fifty percent of the votes cast is sufficient. Courts have
never touched this issue because the outcome of shareholder
voting in German stock corporations almost always reaches
majorities of more than ninety percent. However, it has to be taken
into account that some German scholars have a different
understanding of the Holzmifller doctrine and argue in favor of a
seventy-five percent majority. German literature is still guessing
when exactly and how far this Holzmifller doctrine is applicable
and whether is should be extended on other similar important
transactions.239  There is a great uncertainty in the German
239 The literature is more than voluminous. The leading monographs are
PETER HOMMELHOFF, DIE KONZERNLEITUNGSPFLICHT (1982); PFTR 0. MOLBERT,
AKTIENGESELSCHAFT, UNTERNEHMENSGRUPPE UND KAPITALMARKT- Dii
AKrIONARSRECHTE BEI BILDUNG UND UMBILDUNG EINER UNTERNEIIMENSGRUPPE
ZWISCHEN VERBANDS- UND ANLEGERSCHUTZRECHT (2d ed. 1996). See also Detlev
Joost, "Holzmziller 2000" vor dem Hintergrund des Umwandlungsgeselzes, 163
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT [ZHR] 164
(1999) (investigating the application of the Holzmfiller doctrine under the new
German Transformation Act); Klaus-Peter Martens, Die Enlscheidungsauionomie des
Vorstands und die "Basisdemokratie" in der Aktiengesellschaft: Anmerkungen zu BGHZ
83, S. 122 ("Holzmriller"), 147 ZErrscHRmFr FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 377 (1983) (strictly disclaiming the existence of
unwritten shareholder vote); Hans-Joachim Priester, Die klassische Ausgliederung -
ein Opfer des Umwandlungsgesetzes 1994?, 163 ZErrscHRIFr FOR DAS GESAMTE
HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTScHAFrSRECHT [ZHR] 187 (1999) (investigating the
application of the Holzmuller doctrine); Winfried Werner,
Zustdndigkeitsverlagerungen in der Aktiengesellschaft durch Richterrecht? -
Besprechung der Entscheidung BGHZ 83 S. 122 ff., 147 ZEITscHiRFr FOR DAS G ESAMT13
HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHRI 429 (1983) (disclaiming the
existence of unwritten shareholder vote); Harm Peter Westermann,
Individualrechte und unternehmerische Handlungsfreiheit im Aktienrecht, 156
ZErrsClmFr FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFSRECHrr [ZHR] 203
(1992).
For a synopsis of the discussion, see YORK SCHNORBUS, GESTALTUNGSFREIHEIT
IM UMWANDLUNGSRECHT-DAS VERHALTNIS DES UMwG ZU STRUKTURMASSNAHMN
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corporate community, and lawyers tend to advise their clients to
ask for shareholder approval in any doubtful case. In light of this
confusion the German Government Commission on Corporate
Governance is considering whether and how to amend this.240
5.4.3. Legal Means of Influencing the Decision-Making Process
5.4.3.1. Regarding the Management Board
Under the Stock Corporation Act, it is not legally possible to
confer to the holder of tracking stock the right to appoint
individual members of the management board to preserve their
rights and interests.241 The supervisory board242 exclusively makes
appointments and revocation of appointments of management
board members. The supervisory board may remove members of
the management board according to section 84(3) of the AktG243
only for an "important cause" (wich tiger Grund).2" The
supervisory board can neither directly nor indirectly be influenced
in its decision to appoint or revoke an appointment.2 45 All
personnel matters regarding the management board are its
sovereign decision.246 Any contract or provision in the articles of
AuERHALB SEINES ANWENDUNGSBEREICHES IM SYSr.M DES GESANTEN
UMWANDLUNGSRECHTS (2001), §§ 47-71 [hereinafter ScHmo.pus,
GESrALTUNGSFREIHE IM UMWVANDLUNGSRECHT]; Rosengarten, supra note 236, at
445.
240 Baums, General Meetings in Listed Companies- New Czallenges and
Opportunities, supra note 215, at 9.
241 Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at 1283.
242 § 84, AktG.
243 § 84(3), AktG.
244 By contrast, in the United States senior executives typically serve at the
will of the board, subject only to whatever contract rights they have. Finally, the
fact that the AktG requires supervisory board meetings in publicly held stock
corporations only four times annually further underscores the independence of
the management board. § 110(3), AktG; see Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections
on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL L
REV. 1819,1824-25 (1996) [hereinafter Andre, Some Reflections on German Corporate
Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards] (illustrating the differences
behveen the German supervisory board structure and that of Anglo-Saxon
countries).
245 Baums & M6ller, supra note 175, at 68.
246 HOFFER, supra note 145, § 84 margin no. 5; 2 HANS-JOACHIM MERTiDS, In:
KOLNER KowiENTAR ZUM AKnENGESETZ, at § 84, margin no. 8 (Wolfgang Zllner
ed., 2d ed. 1988).
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incorporation violating this sovereignty is invalid.247 Thus, except
in circumstances where a given shareholder or group of
shareholders is in the position to control the makeup of the
shareholder side of the supervisory board, shareholders have no
direct impact on the appointment or removal of the management
board members.
5.4.3.2. Regarding the Supervisory Board
The most direct pressure point for investors is not on those
who actually manage the business, but rather on the supervisory
board. However, this impact should not be overestimated either.
According to section 101(1) of the AktG,248 the members of the
supervisory board are elected by the stockholders (and, if
applicable, by the employees 249). The common, and usually the
only, way for shareholders to influence management is by voting
for members of the supervisory board who are willing to appoint
persons to the management board who represent the interests of
particular groups of shareholders. 250 In some stock corporations
the articles grant, exceptionally, the right to appoint members of
the supervisory board to certain shareholders or the holders of
certain shares. Such a delegation is permissible under the
requirements of section 101(2) of the AktG25l and applies also in
respect to holders of tracking stock.252
Nonetheless, the duties and rights of the supervisory board are
strictly separate from those of the management board and the
247 See § 134 German Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch/BGB); § 23(5), AktG;
see also HOFFER, supra note 145, § 84 margin no. 5.
248 § 101(1), AktG.
249 See, for example, Butler, supra note 125, at 561-64, for the labor
representatives on the supervisory board. See also Andre, Some Reflections on
German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, supra note
244, at 1826-28 (explaining that labor representatives on supervisory boards have
less relative power than their numbers would suggest).
250 The resolution of the shareholders' meeting regarding the appointment of
the members of the supervisory board usually requires, according to section
133(1) of the AktG, a majority of the votes cast ("simple majority") unless the law
or the articles of incorporation provide for a larger majority or additional
requirements. Section 133(2) of the AktG states that the articles may set forth
different rules with respect to elections.
25S § 101(2), AktG.
252 Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiar/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at 1283.
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shareholders' meeting. Although elected by the shareholders'
meeting, the supervisory board is never subject to stockholder
instruction but rather must fulfill its duties independently.2 3
Neither the stockholders' meeting nor individual shareholders are
bn law entitled to instruct members of the supervisory board in any
way. This principle applies also to members of the supervisory
board who have been delegated by stockholders. Thus,
supervisory board members delegated according to section 101(2)
of the AktG24 have the same duties and rights as elected members
according to section 101(1) of the AktG.255 They must place the
interests of the company before the interests of the delegating
parties and must safeguard company interests, and are by law not
subject to instructions of the delegating party.
25 6
Disregarding this lack of influence, delegation rights may, due
to section 101(2),25 only be granted to specific shareholders named
in the articles ("personal right of delegation") or to the holders of
certain shares ("transferable right of delegation"). Both
alternatives barely make sense, at least in a publicly held
company.258 Whereas the personal right of delegation is connected
with a particular person named in the articles and therefore is not
transferable to a third party, the delegation right to holders of
certain shares necessitates, pursuant to section 101(2)(ii) of the
AktGP9 that these shares are in registered form and their transfer
depends on the consent of the stock corporation.M Consequently,
such stocks only have difficulties or are not even fungible and thus
unsuitable for trading on a stock exchange. In sum, there is no
special provision to accomplish the interests of tracking
stockholders on the supervisory board. Rather, all shareholders
are still equal.
253 HOFFER, supra note 145, § 101 margin no. 10.
Z4 § 101(2), AktG.
2 § 101(1), AktG.
256 Judgment of January 29,1962, BGHZ 36,296 (306); HOFFER, supra note 134,
§ 101 margin no. 10; KARSrEN SCMIIDT, supra note 125, at 840.
2-7 § 101(2), AktG.
253 For a dissenting opinion, see Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock, supra
note 119, at 393.
259 §101(2)(ii), AktG.
260 Such a restriction on transferability in the stock corporation is possible
according to section 68(2) of the AktG.
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5.4.4. Management Liability
The liability of the management does not only compensate
damages of shareholders after the fact, but it is also a prophylactic
measure of compliance with the legal requirements in a tracking
stock corporation. The practical importance of directors' liability
under German law, however, is still quite limited.261 Court
decisions are comparatively rare, albeit with greater frequency in
recent years.262 In the following section, the paper will explain the
principles of management liability under German law, and
examine recent American impact, i.e., whether the business
judgment rule also protects German managers, and if there is a
special standard in tracking stock corporations.
5.4.4.1. Basics of Civil Liability Under Section 93, AktG
In conducting business, the members of the management board
have to employ the care of a diligent and conscientious
manager 263. 264 As in the United States, this standard places a
burden on management to act in a fiduciary capacity and
undertake activities which are bona fide in the company's best
interest (Unternehmensinteresse). Delaware corporate law
differentiates between the "duty of care" and the "duty of loyalty."
German law applies a similar standard, whereby management's
fiduciary duties toward the corporation under German corporate
law are repeatedly referred to as Sorgfalts - und Treuepflichten.2
65
261 For a general overview about management liability under the German
Stock Corporation Act in English, see, for example, Klaus J. Hopt, Directors' Duties
to Shareholders, Employees, and other Creditors: A View from the Continent, in
COMMERCIAL ASPEcrs OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 115-32 (Ewan
McKendrick ed., 1992).
262 However, it should be taken into account that liability disputes between
directors and their companies may well be settled outside the courtroom, and the
relative lack of court decisions does not say anything about the preventative
function of such rules.
263 § 93(1), AktG.
264 This is the standard of a manager acting with similar obligations as a
fiduciary. HOFFER, supra note 145, § 93 margin no. 4.
265 Willi Joachim, The Liability of Supervisory Board Directors in Germany, 25
INT'L LAW. 41, 56 (1991); Bernd Singhof & Oliver Seiler, Shareholder Participation in
Corporate Decisionmaking under German Law: A Comparative Analysis, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 493, 551 (1998). At least in practice these standards on management
conduct will lead to the same conclusions, although the common law system
seems somewhat wider and more developed than its German counterpart. For a
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Members of the board who violate their duties shall be jointly and
severally liable to the stock corporation for any resulting
damage2
66.267
The circumstances of each case must be examined by the court
to determine whether a particular management board member has
acted with the care of a diligent and prudent executive.ES "The
controlling criterion in this regard is not 'customary' diligence or
carelessness, but 'necessary' diligence."2 69 It is a high objective
standard, which does not depend on the knowledge and abilities of
the particular member.270 A director therefore will not succeed
with the defense that he has acted with such care as he would
apply in his own affairs. Directors need not take all possible care
but must take more than the usual care that might be expected of
an ordinary person.
broader overview, see also THOMtAS ABELTSHAusER, LEITUNGSHAFrUNG IM
KAPrrALGESELLscHAFTsREciT (1998).
266 § 93(2)(i), AktG.
267 Besides this general standard, the Stock Corporation Act sets out specific
requirements of conduct. Members of the management board shall not disclose
confidential information and secrets of the company, in particular trade and
business secrets, which have become known to them as a result of their services
on the board. § 93(1)(ii), AktG. They have special duties relating to insolvency
and bankruptcy of the corporation. § 92, AktG. Section 93(3) of the AktG
specifically enumerates instances in which members of the management board
themselves may be held liable. The respective board member bears the burden of
proving he has complied with this standard of care. § 93(2)(ii), AkG.
m At least in theory German law differentiates between the breach of a
contractual or statutory duty and the question whether the director has acted
negligently. In practice however, both aspects reduce in most cases to one
question, that is, how a prudent and diligent manager would have acted. That is
an objective and comparatively high standard.
269 HOFFER, supra note 151, § 93 margin no. 3-4.
270 Because an individual member may be deemed to have breached this
standard by tolerating the mismanagement of others, he must take reasonable
steps to prevent breaches of this standard by the board, or any of its members. In
other words, diversification in a single company does not prevent managers'
liability. If a member believes that a resolution on a business measure passed by
the board is tantamount to a breach of this standard of care, he must clearly
express his view and do everything in his power to prevent the transaction from
being carried out If not otherwise possible, he or she must involve the
supervisory board. See Judgment of October 15, 1996, BGHZ 133, 370, 377-78;
HOFFER, supra note 145, § 93 margin no. 13b; Walter Oppenhoff & Thomas 0.
Verhoeven, The Stock Corporation, in BusiNEss TRANSACIONS IN GEmz.iAw, 24-52
(Dennis Campbell et al. eds., 2000).
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5.4.4.2. The Business Judgment Rule Under German Corporate
Law
The question is whether German courts always apply this
objective standard immediately under section 93(1) of the AktG271
or whether there is place for a reasoning like the "business
judgment rule" under Delaware corporate law corresponding to
judicial self-restraint. A comparison of Delaware and German
decisions might suggest at first glance that the business judgment
rule gives the American board of directors broader discretion than
their German colleagues.272 Indeed, German courts sometimes do
not hesitate to question whether members of the management
board took unreasonable risks or if the board crossed a line drawn
by the corporation's benefits.2 3 This can lead to second-guessing
of decisions made by the board, which Delaware courts try to
avoid.
However, recent developments in German corporate law tend
to lead to the conclusion that corporate law should encourage, and
afford broad protection to, informed business judgments in order
to stimulate risk taking, innovation, and other creative
entrepreneurial activities. But the German approach is somewhat
different. As already pointed out, the standard of "prudent
business conduct" says more about how a director has to act rather
than what he has to do or should have done, i.e., the courts
themselves develop and crystallize the directors' duties in a given
situation. This gives leeway for judicial self-restraint. Doing so,
the Bundesgerichtshof has only recently explicitly acknowledged a
standard of judicial self-restraint.2 74  In the landmark case
ARAG/Garmenbeck,275 the highest court for corporate causes
2 § 93(2)(i), AktG.
272 According to the analysis of Butler, supra note 125, at 559.
273 It is a historical self-understanding of German judges that they are
appointed to decide cases and therefore have the power to scrutinize all legal
matters of a case. In particular, this includes the question whether someone has
conducted himself with due care or not.
274 See Judgment of April 21,1997, BGHZ 135,244.
275 The decision is comprehensively discussed in scholarly literature. See, e.g.,
Meinrad Dreher, Anmerkung zu BGH, Urt. v. 21.4.1997- II ZR 175/95 [case review
of the decision ARAG/Garmenbeck], 52 JURISTEN ZErrUNG UJZ] 1074 (1997)
[hereinafter Dreher, Anmerkung zu BGH, Urt. v. 21.4.1997- II ZR 175/95]; Heinrich
G6tz, Die Pflicht des Aufsichtsrats zur Habhaftmachung von Vorstandsmitgliedern -
Besprechung des ARAG-Urteils des BGH-, 50 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCIRIFT
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concluded that there is a borderline between the violation of the
duty care and loyalty on the one hand and entrepreneurial faults in
the conduct of the company on the other hand. The latter
imperfection encompasses, for example, the burden of risks and
the danger of wrong forecasts, i.e., circumstances and
developments to with which every manager is faced. When the
manager fails in this course of business, the supervisory board
might be entitled to revoke his or her appointment of a member of
the management board, but, according to this judgment, the
granted discretion as an entrepreneur gives the protection against
civil liability.276
Whether, through this ruling, the business judgment rule
derived from the American corporate law has entirely found its
way into German jurisprudence might be still uncertain because
the court did not explicitly refer to this discussion and the majority
of the scholarly literature is confused. However, prominent
commentators argue with good and convincing reasons that at
least the basic ideas of the business judgment rule have become
current law in the German stock corporation.2v This point of view
is chiefly supported by a particular statement in the court's opinion
which is quite similar to the requirements of the business judgment
rule. According to these crucial sentences in the decision, a board
member can only be held liable if he has dearly departed from the
bounds of responsible action aimed exclusively at furthering the
welfare of the corporation and based on a careful investigation of
the underlying facts, or if he has been prepared to take
entrepreneurial risk to an irresponsible extent, or if his actions
must be deemed to have been committed in disregard of his
[NJW] 3275 (1997); Johannes Grooterhorst, Die ARAGIGannenbeck-Prozesse-eine
Gesamtschau im Rackblick, 20 ZErrScHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSREcHT [ZIP] 1117 (1999)
(emphasizing the resulting increased risk of liability of the supervisory board
members); Norbert Horn, Die Haftung des Vorstandes der AG nadi § 93 AkLIG und die
Pflichten des Aufsidchtsrats, 18 ZErrsCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFrMREaHT [ZIP], 1129 (1997)
(considering this case as the breakthrough to a business judgment rule under the
German Stock Corporation Law).
276 See Judgment of April 21,1997, BGHZ 135,244,253.
277 Some commentators argue in this way. Sce Horn, supra note 275, at 1134-
35. Also, before the decision from April 21,1997 of the Bundesgerichtshof, see, for
example, BunKHARD BAsrucK, ENTHAFrUNG DES MANAGFMENTS 23 (1936); HERBERT
WIEDEMANN, ORGANVERANTWORTUNG UND GESELLSCHAFrER1MLAGEN IN DER
AKrINGESELLScHAFr 13 (1989).
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obligations for any other reason.2  Obviously, this is in other
words nothing more than the business judgment rule.
The language of section 93(1) of the AktG is broad enough to
implement the caselaw and the experiences under American law,27 9
and the management of stock corporations is at least well advised
and on the safe side280 if it complies with a standard equivalent to
the business judgment rule. That means a management board
member is free from liability if he proves: (1) that he has obtained
sufficient information, to the available extent, prior to taking his
decision; (2) that he was not in a conflict of interest in making that
particular decision; and (3) that in taking his decision he had
reasonable grounds to believe that he was acting in the best
interests of the corporation.28'
5.4.4.3. Different Standards in a Tracking Stock Corporation?
The general conclusion that, at a minimum, the basic ideas of
the business judgment rule also apply under German stock
corporation law leads to the corresponding issues in the tracking
stock context, inasmuch as there exist no significant differences.
278 The court stated in German:
Diese kann erst dann in Betracht kommen, wenn die Grenzen, in denen sich ein
von Verantwortungsbewusstsein getragenes, ausschliefllich am
Unternehmenswohl orientiertes, auf sorgf]Itigen Ennittlung der
Entscheidungsgrundlagen beruhendes unternehmerisches Handeln bewegen
mufi, deutlich fiberschritten sind, die Bereitschaft unternehmerische Risiken
einzugehen, in unverantwortlicher Weise fiberspannt worden ist oder das
Verhalten des Vorstandes aus anderen Griinden als pflichtwidrig gelten muss.
BGHZ, 135,244 (253-54).
2n § 93(1), AktG.
280 For instance, the process-oriented approach of the Delaware courts has
provided American attorneys with a checklist of procedural rituals that a board
should follow in making a decision. See therefore the summary Balotti et al.,
supra note 58, at 663-64, which states:
Whenever possible, a board should not act in haste because hasty action
has been criticized as indicative of a lack of due care. Written materials
should be available to the board, preferably in advance, and the board
should consider the materials during its deliberations. Directors should
participate actively in the decision-making process and question
management and any consultants or advisors who make presentations to
the board.
These guidelines could also be applied under German corporate law.
281 See Horn, supra note 275, at 1134.
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However, some German lawyers mention the threat of uncertain
civil liability of management board members if their
compensation-especially through stock option plans-is linked to
the performance of different business segments. 2 The application
of the American experiences under the business judgment rule
brings light to this question. The analysis under Delaware
corporate law has shown that courts are reluctant to modify or
even to increase the requirements under the business judgment
rule. The Court of Chancery stated in a convincing manner that
directors often must resolve conflicts among classes of stock, and
the fact that a majority of the directors potentially own more of one
class than another would not necessarily implicate the director's
good faith and loyalty. Sometimes it is merely indispensable for
the management to make decisions that benefit one class of stock at
the expense of another, disregarding their own holdings in the
company. A financial stake must not have a material effect on
director action. Rather, in order to make the business judgment
rule inapplicable, the concerned shareholder must plead that the
amount of such holdings in one business segment and the
predominance of such holdings over other segments, was of a
sufficiently material importance as to have made it improbable that
the director could perform her fiduciary duties to the shareholders
without being influenced by her overriding personal interest in the
performance of "their" tracked segment. An unequal potential
investment in the different classes of tracking stock cannot
automatically deny the application of the business judgment rule.
Furthermore, sometimes it is not even technically possible or not
desired to guarantee an identical investment in all tracked units.23
To deprive management's entrepreneurial discretion in such cases
could obviously not be in the interest of any party. Corporate
governance is not an issue particular to tracking stock, but rather a
general issue, and in all quoted stock corporations it is to be
achieved through implemented guidelines like a Code of Best
Practice, in a responsible, value-oriented management and control.
22 Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at 1234.
3 For instance, in case that tracking stock is introduced as a merger currency
or to give the management special incentives.
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5.4.5. The Role of the Supervisonr Board
The supervisory board's primary and original function is only
to supervise and to advise the management board but not to
capture management assignments. Management responsibilities
may not be delegated to the supervisory board.284  A very
important relaxation of this principle is provided by section
111(4)(ii) of the AktG.2m If required by the articles or resolved by
the supervisory board, certain legal acts or management
transactions are permitted only with the prior consent of the
supervisory board.286 The catalog of acts subject to prior consent
may be more detailed, more comprehensive or more restricted,
depending on the intended scope of the management board's
independence, and may give sufficient legal basis to implement a
further prophylactic measure management in a tracking stock
company.287 It is important to recognize that the principle of equal
treatment of shareholders28  unrestrainedly applies to the
supervisory board. That means that the supervisory board, for
every consent under section 111(4)(ii) of the AktG289 has to
consider all striking interests of the different groups of
shareholders and to seek a fair and objective settlement. The
supervisory board members are also personally liable to the stock
corporation. The applicable duty of care and responsibility as set
forth for the management board in section 93 of the AktG290 applies
analogously to members of the supervisory board291.292
M § 111(4)(i), AktG.
25§ 111(4)(ii), AktG.
286 In practice this means that, since the supervisory board has been
empowered to grant or to withhold its consent, the management board includes
the supervisory board in the decision-making process from the beginning in order
to avoid a veto.
2V However, the right to take the initiative always remains with the
management board, even in such cases; this means that the supervisory board
may not, by excessive consent requirements, impair the management board's
function as sole manager of the corporation and the consent may be required only
in particular cases. See, e.g., Baums & M6ler, supra note 175, at 70-71.
288 § 53a, AktG.
289 § 111(4)(ii), AktG.
290 § 93, AktG.
291 § 116, AktG.
292 Disregarding the acknowledgment of an entrepreneurial discretion, the
ARAG/Garmenbeck case has its problems and insufficiencies in the context of the
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liability of the supervisory board. The enforcement of directors' duties by the
shareholders themselves is generally rendered difficult by German law. Vis-1-vis
its managing directors, a stock corporation is represented by its supervisory
board. § 112, AktG. This includes the power to commence an action against a
wrongdoing director in the company's name. The problem with this solution is
that very often in the case of fault of the managing directors, the supervisory
board could equally be blamed for not having fulfilled its monitoring tasks
correctly. Hence, the supervisory board will normally be reluctant to take action
against the members of the management board ("old boys networking").
Therefore, the Bundesgeridtshof held in the ARAG/Gamtenbzck case that the
supervisory board can even be obligated to sue management
However, that leads to the problem that the foregoing extenuation of liability
of the management board is balanced, via the court ruling quoted above, by the
imposition of increased obligations on the supervisory board, which is now
required to examine the existence of any damage claims of the stock corporation
against executive board members on its own responsibility and to assert such
claims on behalf of the corporation! In this process the supervisory board must
first determine the likelihood of the charges. If it considers them to be indeed
conclusive, i.e., if the executive board is convinced that the management board
member is liable for damages, it shall examine the chances for success in courL In
doing so, it must take into account potential difficulties in adducing evidence. The
decisive question is whether, by filing suit, it will actually be possible to achieve
full or partial compensation for the damage sustained; in this context the
recoverability of the sum in question (i.e., the enforceability of its collection) will
also have to be addressed. If the foregoing examination demonstrates that the
stock corporation does have an enforceable damage claim, the executive board is
basically required to assert such claim. It may decide against such assertion only
in the exceptional case that there exist weighty reasons, related to the welfare of
the corporation, which speak against a pursuit of the matter and outweigh the
reasons in favor of such pursuit. Such considerations may include negative effects
on the company's business operations or its public image, an obstruction of the
executive board's work, or a degradation of the working atmosphere within the
company. Aspects related to the person of the relevant executive board
member(s) shall not be taken into account in the supervisory board's
deliberations, except in exceptional cases. As a rule, therefore, the supervisory
board is not allowed to spare an otherwise meritorious executive board member,
or to consider the social consequences of a court action on that executive member
and his family. If the supervisory board, although the foregoing prerequisites are
met, fails to assert the corporation's liability claim against an executive board
member, it itself becomes liable for damages vis-Z-vis the corporation. In sum,
nothing has changed. The court has just decreased the level of liability of one
organ (management board) in order to increase the level of liability of another
organ (advisory board). Thus, the ruling has a somewhat "catch 22" flavor.
For more criticism, see the landmark article of Meinrad Dreher, Das Erressen
des Aufsichtsrats- Der Aufsiditsrat ih der Aktiengesdlscaft zzeisden
Verbandsautonomie und Richterkontrolle, 158 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS C-S. ATE
HsnDEtsRchT uiN WirTsc1ArsEc=t [ZHR] 614 (1994); especially addressing
this decision in question GROOTERHORSr, supra note 288, at 1117; Dreher,
Anmerkung zu BGH, Urt. v. 21.4.1997-I ZR 175/95, supra note 275, at 1074.
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Because the contemplation of establishing a new tracking stock
corporation is rather unlikely, the Article will focus on the
following two main ways to implement a tracking stock culture:
(1) the issuance of new tracking stock; and (2) the transformation of
already outstanding tracking stock.
5.5.1. Issuance of Newv Tracking Stock
5.5.1.1. Capital Increase
From the company's point of view, the obvious way to create
new tracking stock is, at first glance, to increase share capital. This
method neither affects liquidity nor reduces profits, but rather
results in an increase in the company's funding. There are
exclusively293 three types of increases in share capital which are
available in this context: the ordinary share capital increase in
return for contributions (ordentliche Kapitalerhohung),294  a
conditional share capital increase (bedingte Kapitalerhohung),295 and
an authorized share capital increase (genehmigte Kapitalerhohung).296
293 To create new tracking stock via bonus stock, i.e., stock that is issued for
no consideration, as, for example, an enticement to buy some other type or class of
security, is not achievable under the Stock Corporation Act. See Sieger &
Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at 1280.
294 §§ 182-191, AktG. The aim of the ordinary capital increase is to raise the
fixed amount of share capital stipulated in the articles of incorporation and to
provide the company with fresh cash.
295 §§ 192-201, AktG. A conditional capital increase enables a stock
corporation to offer shares with a conversion or subscription right without
knowing the extent to which these rights will be exercised. The completion of the
capital increase and therefore the actual increase in the share capital are
conditional both with respect to scope and timing.
296 §§ 202-206, AktG. Authorized capital means that the management board
has been authorized by a shareholders' resolution to increase share capital at its
own discretion, within the limits set by the shareholders' resolution and the law.
Authorized capital is accordingly very common among German stock
corporations. It gives the management board freedom to issue new shares as are
necessary to preserve the company. Authorized capital is also employed to
provide the management with M&A currency or defense measures. An increase
of authorized capital by contributions in kind is permissible only if expressly
approved by the shareholders' meeting. The management board decides on the
class of the new shares, the rights resulting therefrom and the conditions of the
issuance. Such decision needs the approval of the supervisory board. Thus, even
if the shareholders' meeting has approved an authorized capital some time ago,
the shareholders through their representatives on the supervisory board have the
power to control the issue of new shares.
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The resolution to increase the share capital requires a vote by a
majority of three-quarters of the share capital represented at the
shareholders' meeting.9 7 The articles of incorporation may set
forth a different capital majority; only in the case of a conditional
capital increase or in the case of an authorized capital increase is a
higher capital majority permissible 9 If, at the time of the issuance
of new stock, there are tracking stock already outstanding and
therefore different classes of stock exist according to section 11 of
the AktG,299 class voting in the manner of section 138 of the AktG3z0
is required.3 '
Although comparatively easy to accomplish, the
implementation of tracking stock via a capital increase can under
some circumstances be faced with the drawback that common
stock still remains. Thus, for a reorganization of the company
towards a complete tracking stock culture, this method is
inappropriate. Nonetheless, the capital increase structure is the
primary choice if it is the goal to track merely one particular
business segment or to provide only a special group of persons
with tracking stock. This will, for instance, especially be the case to
finance a merger and to convince the shareholders of the target
company to join the deal or to track a whole subsidiary.Pz
5.5.1.2. Preemptive Rights
The issuance of new tracking stock via a capital increase raises
another and, under German law, very crucial issue. From the
current shareholders' point-of-view a capital increase is connected
with a row of disadvantages. In particular, this structure results in
a capital dilution of their respective ownership. 03 That triggers the
question of whether the existing shareholders are entitled to a
2W §§ 182(1)(i), 193(1)(i), 202(2)(ii), ACtG.
29 §§ 182(1)(ii), 193(1)(ii), 202(2)(iii), AktG.
299 § 11, AktG.
300 § 138, AktG.
301 §§ 182(2), 193(1)(ii), 202(2)(iv), AktG.
302 Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at 1278,
1281.
303 See HERBERT HIRTE, BEZUGSRECHTSAUSSCHLUSS UND KONZERNBILDUNG -
MINDERHETNSCHUTZ BEI EINGRIFFEN IN DIE BETEUGuNGssTRUxI"uR DER
AKrIENGESELLscHAFr at 7 (1986), [hereinafter HREm, BEZUGSRECHTSAUSS.HLUSS UND
KONZERNBILDUNG], for a comprehensive analysis.
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proportionate part of the newly issued shares. Such rights are
designated "preemptive rights" (Bezugsrecht). From the company's
perspective, however, it will often be desirable or even mandatory
to distribute the new shares only to persons outside the
corporation, for instance, to finance a tender offer or a merger.
While most U.S. jurisdictions legally do not grant shareholders
preemptive rights and typically provide that shareholders do not
have preemptive rights unless set forth in the charter,3 4 the
presumption under German stock corporation law is exactly the
opposite. Shareholders do have preemptive rights to subscribe for
any issue of shares, convertible bonds or debt instruments in
proportion to the shares held by such shareholder in the existing
capital of such corporation, 0 5 unless the corporation opts out of
this rule by a shareholder resolution approved by the super-
majority of seventy-five percent of the shares voting upon its
proposal.306
Moreover, the exclusion of the preemptive rights
(Bezugsrechtsausschlu3) is, from the German corporate law
perspective, such a deep encroachment on the ownership position
of the stockholder, that courts have for a long time required a
further "unwritten" justification for the shareholder approval to be
deemed legal.307 In preliminary terms the elimination of the
preemptive rights must be reasonable and necessary. As a rule of
thumb, the transaction is only justifiable if it is in the corporation's
interest and if the purpose for the capital increase cannot be
attained in the normal legal way, i.e., granting complete
preemptive rights to all shareholders. For instance, elimination is
304 Originally, the preemptive right was recognized by the courts as
mandatory, but now every state by statute allows the corporate charter to limit or
deny the common law preemptive right or eliminates the preemptive right unless
it is affirmatively granted by corporate charter. See JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
CORPORATIONS 474 (1997), and now DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) prior to the
amendment in 1967, for the elimination of preemptive rights as a general rule.
305 For more information on the comprehensiveness of preemptive rights in
general terms as well as in terms of tracking stock see THIEL, SPARTENAKTIEN, supra
note 7, at 237-39.
306 § 186, AktG.
307 However, the German legislator admitted in 1994 by law a special case of
a permissible exclusion of preemptive rights: according to section 186(3)(iv) of the
AktG, the exclusion of preemptive rights is permitted if a capital increase for cash
contributions does not exceed ten percent of the stated share capital and the issue
price is not substantially less than the stock exchange price.
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justified by significant and reasonable business interests if it can be
assumed that the resulting benefits for all stockholders would
outweigh the proportionate loss experienced by the excluded
stockholders. 303 This assessment means that the exclusion of
preemptive rights is always exceptional rather than usualZ0
So far as financial innovations and extraordinary legal
situations are involved, it should be noted that the determination
of whether this cut of shareholder rights is reasonable and
necessary is mainly made on a case-by-case basis and is strictly
construed. Thus, uncertainties in the deal structure to introduce
tracking stock are preprogrammed. Companies always have to
take into account that preemptive rights of existing shareholders
affect the manner of creation of a tracking stock culture, e.g.,
preemptive rights are not automatically excluded from shares
issued to finance an asset or share deal, rather, the company has
additionally to prove that there are no other ways available to
finance the transactions to equal conditions with cash.310 Further, if
a company is already characterized by a complex share structure, it
might not be desirable to grant preemptive rights to all classes of
30s See the landmark decision "Kali+Salz" of March 13, 1978, BGHZ 71, 40
(46); see also Judgment of March 7, 1994, BGHZ 125, 239(241); Judgment of
November 9,1992, BGHZ 120,141(145-146); Judgment of April 19,1932, BGHZ 83,
319(321); STEFAN GRUNDMANN, DER TREUHANDVERTRAG-INSBESONDERE DIE
WERBENDE TREUHAND 460-65 (1997); HIRT, BEZUGsRECHTSAUssCHLUSS UND
KONZERNBILDUNG, supra note 303, at 15-30.
309 However, the major reasons that prevent German stock corporations from
excluding preemptive rights are litigation issues. Although courts tend to be
more liberal on this matter, the outcome of legal proceedings is often unclear.
German corporate law leaves room for opportunistic behavior of dissenting
shareholders in this poinL In order to become valid, the amendment of the
articles of association regarding the capital increase and the exclusion of the
preemptive rights must be filed with and registered by the commercial register
(Handelsregister). Within one month after shareholder approval, a shareholder
could file an annulment action with the district court (Landgericht). A law suit
can, but must not prevent the commercial register to approve the capital increase.
Nonetheless, as long as the court does not conclude that the law suit is a strike
suit that misuses the right to sue and turns it down on these grounds, the law suit
may hinder the dosing of the deal since the capital increase will not be executed
in the commercial register. So far as there are any doubts left regarding the
legality of the transaction, the commercial register will refuse to approve the
capital increase. Thus, the implementation of tracking stock could be blocked for
more than a year.
310 HIRmE, BEZUGSRECHTSAUSSCHLUSS UND KONZERNBILDUNG, supra note 303, at
77; HOFFER, supra note 145, § 186 margin no. 34.
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stock. However, the exclusion of preemptive rights of a particular
class to the benefit of another class always needs a special
justification. 3" At least it seems to be settled that a company can
exclude the subscription rights for new shares to introduce
incentive programs for the benefit of employees.312
5.5.2. Transformation of Outstanding Stock
Instead of issuance of new tracking stock, the company can also
transform already existing common stock into tracking stock.
313
For this approach different structures can be contemplated under
the Stock Corporation Act, including the modification of the
already existing dividend and liquidation rights in the articles, a
share split, and a merger with a subsidiary.
5.5.2.1. Modification of Already Outstanding Stock
The modification of the monetary rights granted by the articles
of incorporation of already outstanding stock in order to transform
them to tracking stock is permissible under the Stock Corporation
Act. It needs a vote by a majority of three-quarters of the share
capital represented at the shareholders' meeting.314 In the case that
previously different classes of stocks have been established class
voting is also required.315 Because such an approval of the
shareholders leads to an extraordinary interference of monetary
rights of dissenting shareholders, the prevailing and correct
opinion in the literature calls for a unanimous vote of all
shareholders in the concerned class ("unanimous class voting"). 316
Even though at first glance it appears to be a very convenient
way, the modification of the articles in order to establish a tracking
311 See, e.g., Judgment of October 6,1969, BGHZ 33,175(186).
312 See Judgment of April 19,1982, BGHZ 83,319(323); HOFFER, supra note 145,
§ 186 margin no. 39.
313 The American counterparts of this transaction are the recapitalization of
existing common into new common and tracking stock or by a distribution of
tracking stock on the common stock.
314 § 179(2)(i), AktG.
315 § 179(3), AktG.
316 BAUMS, Spartenorganisation, "Tracking Stock" und deutsches Aktienrecht, supra
note 35, at 29; HOFFER, supra note 145, § 60 margin no. 8; LuTrER, supra note 153, §
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stock culture confronts the company with nearly insurmountable
impediments 317 This method raises allocation problems because in
reality a company can never be divided in the manner that all
business segments reflect exactly the equivalent value. Even if it
would be executable to create tracking stock linked to different
business segments with the equivalent value par share, the
economic value of the newly created financial tool tracking stock
will not be the equivalent to the former outstanding common stock
for all the shareholders. Whether the undertaking of an investment
like tracking stock has a positive net present value is an individual
question and depends on other available investment opportunities
in the shareholder's portfolio and the degree of risk the investor
wants to bear. This subjective component of the valuation process
leads unavoidably to a negative net present value for some
shareholders and triggers their unanimous class voting. But in a
publicly held company unanimous voting-even in only one
particular class of shareholders-is barely possible. Eventually it is
hard to figure out which shareholders are indeed deprived and
who belongs, therefore, to the concerned class. Lawsuits are
therefore more than probable.318 Considering all of these described
pains with the benefits of a tracking stock culture, companies are
usually not well advised to choose exclusively the way over a
modification of the monetary rights of already outstanding stock.
5.5.2.2. Stock Split
This allocation problem can be prevented through a
distribution of the new several tracking stock in one chunk, ie.,
every shareholder gets in exchange for one common stock the
equivalent amount of, for example, A, B, and C tracking stock.
This block of tracking stock is equivalent in terms of value to the
common stock with the consequence that no shareholder is
disadvantaged and unanimous class voting is not required.3 9 This
method necessitates a stock split; here that is the issuance of three
new shares in exchange for each old share without changing the
317 For this discussion, see Sieger & I-asselbach, Subsidiary/Diuisional shares,
supra note 119, at 1279.
318 Any shareholder could bring a lawsuit, an "annulment action,"
challenging the bona fides of the new issuance, which could lead to postponement
of the registration until final disposition of the matter. See § 243, AktG.
319 Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional shares, supra note 119, at 1279.
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proportional ownership interest of each shareholder.320 According
to section 23(3), number 4 of the AktG,321 the articles of
incorporation must contain the division of the share capital into
either par value shares (Nennbetragsaktie) or non par value shares
(Stiickaktie). For the par value shares, the articles have to name the
par value of shares and the number of shares; for non-par value
shares, the number of such shares. The Stock Corporation Act
allows amendment of its certificate to split its outstanding shares,
so that the number of shares held by each shareholder is increased,
but requires a resolution of the shareholders' meeting pursuant to
section 179(2) of the AktG.322 In sum, the modification of the
articles regarding the monetary rights in order to transfer common
stock into tracking stock, combined with a stock split to provide
every shareholder with a single block of all new stocks, can be an
appropriate method. It is only necessary to recognize that the par
value shares must have at least a minimum par value of one
EUR0323 and that the portion of the share capital attributable to a
non-par value shall also not be less than one EURO.324 Shares with
a lower face value shall be void.325
5.5.2.3. Merger With Subsidian
A further possibility, although pretty complex and risky
concerning lawsuits of dissenting shareholders, is the introduction
of tracking stock through a merger of the parent corporation into a
fully owned subsidiary ("downstream merger").326 The subsidiary,
a so named Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or NewCo, is especially
established for this transaction and already includes tracking stock
structured accordingly to the requirements of the parent company.
Under section 2, number 1 of the German Transformation Act
320 This is not an increase in the capital. Generally, the purpose of the split is
to cut the price of shares that are visually more expensive and increase their
attractiveness for the shareholder.
321 § 23(3) Nr. 4, AktG.
322 § 179(2), AktG.
323 § 8(2), AktG.
324 § 8(3), AktG.
325 §§ 8(2)(ii), 8(3)(iv), AktG.
326 Also imaginable is an upstream merger, i.e., the parent corporation is
merged into its mother company. See Sieger & Hasselbach, Subsidiary/Divisional
shares, supra note 119, at 1280.
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(UmwandlungsgesetzUmwG)327 legal entities may merge by
dissolution without winding-up by way of acquisition, by transfer
of the undertaking as a whole of one legal entity ("transferor
entity") to another existing legal entity ("transferee entity") in
return for the grant of shares in the transferee entity to the owner
of shares in the transferor entity.32 8 For the present case, the
transaction is somewhat exceptional because the parent will be
merged into its wholly-owned subsidiary.329 In downstream
merging, the shares of the subsidiary to be granted in exchange for
shares of the parent company, which were property of the parent
company before the merger, are transferred directly from the
parent company to the shareholders of the parent company in the
course of the merger 3 30 Pursuant to section 65(1) of the UmwG,
the merger resolution of the shareholderb meeting at the parent
company requires a majority comprising at least three quarters of
the stated capital represented at the voting of the resolution 31
5.6. Exit Strategies
Under American law, structuring a unique corporate financial
tool like tracking stock should always contemplate an exit strategy.
A couple of American companies have already employed an exit
procedure in order to take the tracking stocks from the market.
Especially in Germany, where no practical experience with this
327 Umwandlungsgesetz [Transformation Act] of v.28.10.1994 (BGBI. I S. 3210,
and 1995 428), amended by 18.01.2001 (BGBI. I S. 2001 123).
323 See MANFRBD BENKER- & ANNEGRET BURKLE, LAW OF
REORGANIZATIONS/REoRGANIZATION TAX LAW § 2(1) (Bilingual ed., RWS Verlag
Kommumkahons Forum GMbH Koln 1996) [hereinafter UmwG] (detailing
original law).
329 Downstream mergers are problematic because they may cause the
surviving corporation (subsidiary) to acquire the shares in itself previously held
by the disappearing corporation (parent). However, this transaction is also
permissible under German Transformation law. See, e.g., HEINZJOSEF WILMtSEN,
in UMWvANDLUNGSGESETZ § 5 margin no. 71 (Harald Kallmeyer ed., 1997).
3 To prevent some concerns against the downstream merger and to carry
out the transaction, the subsidiary can-controlled by the parent company-
execute a capital increase. The newly issued tracking stock will be offered to the
shareholders of the parent company in contribution of their stocks in the parent
company.
331 So far as several classes of shareholders would exist, § 65(2) UmwG
requires, in addition, the same majority of the shareholders entitled to vote in each
class (class voting).
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innovation exists, an "unwind" feature to reinstate the status quo
can help to convince the involved parties to accomplish the
transaction. American tracking stock structures usually provide
that the issuer can elect to convert the tracking stock into one class
of common stock, consequently leaving only one class of common
stock outstanding that represents the entire equity in the company.
Often a mandatory exchange of tracking stocks or redemption is
generally triggered if the issuer sells the tracked assets ("triggering
events").
As one might guess, German stock corporation law recognizes
all involuntary impacts on the legal and economic position of
shareholders very skeptically. Indeed, unwind features, allowing
the corporation, just at the board's discretion, to reverse a
transaction and to deprive the shareholders of their rights
conferred by the shares, do not comply at all with German visions
of protection of majorities in a stock corporation. However, the
Stock Corporation Act also allows exit features like the voluntary
stock repurchase or the mandatory redemption.
5.6.1. Voluntary Stock Repurchase
As is apparent from former discussions, the Stock Corporation
Act places great emphasis on the integrity of the stated share
capital. One expression about this issue is the repurchase of own
stock.332 The acquisition and holding of its own shares by a stock
corporation is basically prohibited under the German Stock
332 For a comprehensive investigation comparing stock repurchase under
German Common law and German corporate law, see Johannes Stawowy, The
Repurchase of Own Shares by Public Companies and Aktiengesellschaften (1994),
available at http://www.jura.uni-osnabrueck.de/institut/hwr/pdf/paperlS.pdf.
The author notes, "[flor the German observer the idea of a Company repurchasing
its own shares seems to resemble the picture of a snake eating its own tail. It
appears to be highly unnatural and one wonders how the tail can possibly be
eatable for the snake." Id. at 2. However, the authentic reasons are much more
serious. In fact, for more than 100 years it has been settled under German law that
legal entities like the stock corporation are able to hold their own stocks. Rather,
the general concern of the Stock Corporation Act is the protection of the raised
capital. Therefore, section 57 of the AktG forbids any repayment of contributions.
This obviously includes the repurchase of the stock because the cash for this
purpose is derived not from the balance sheet profit, but from other corporate
assets which are designated to provide the corporation's business and to ensure
the claims of the creditors.
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Corporation Act. 33 The most important exception in this context is
provided in section 71 of the AktG.3m This section contains a
catalogue of circumstances in which a stock corporation may
acquire and hold its own shares.
335
5.6.1.1. Section 71(1) Nr. 8, AktG
According to section 71(1) Nr. 8 of the AktGP which is newly
introduced by the KontraG, a company may now offer its own
shares on the basis of an authorization from the shareholders'
meeting which does not exceed eighteen months and which sets
forth the lowest and the highest price for the share and that such
purchase may not exceed ten percent of the share capital.337
Because the articles do not provide for a larger majority, the
resolution requires only a majority of the votes cast (single
majority)338 This method may, therefore, be used in the future for
the repurchase of outstanding tracking stock. Because, under
section 53a of the AktG,339 the principle of equal treatment of all
shareholders shall apply to each purchase and sale of own stock 0
the offer must be granted to all shareholders in proportion to their
holdings in the share capital.341 If the company offers redemption
only to the holders of tracking stock, the principle of equal
treatment of shareholders might be violated at the first glance.
However, the discrimination between holders of tracking stock and
holders of common stock, i.e., two different classes of stock
according to section 11 of the AktG, should at least be deemed as
3n Of course, the corporation may in no case subscribe for its own shares.
§ 56(1), AktG.
3§ 71, AktG.
335 § 71, AktG. This includes, e.g., the purpose of offering them for purchase
by employees of the company or of an affiliated enterprise. For further
comprehensive analysis of the new law, see Mathias Habersack & Christian
Mayer, Share Buybacks in English and German Company Law, 3 CO.iPANY FIN. &
INSOLVENCY L. REv. 330 (2000).
3 § 133(1), AktG.
37 For the scope of this provision-especially regarding management stock
plans-see Roschmann, supra note 142, at 30.
3M § 133(1), AktG.
39 § 53, AktG.
340 See § 71(a) Nr. 8 (iii), AktG.
34, See Baums & M6ler, supra note 175, at 60.
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justified. Section 11 of the AktG342 and other provisions like
sections 60(3) and 271(3)343 of the AktG prove that even under the
Stock Corporation Act shareholders supplied with different rights
can be treated differently. A further reason for this justification can
be seen in the opportunity for the company to explore new
methods of raising corporate funds and nevertheless to be
provided for special circumstances with an exit option.34 4 Thus, on
the one hand section 71(1) Nr. 8 of the AktG345 imparts yet
generally a quite handy way for redemption of stock holders.
However, for the interesting purpose here this method will, due to
the strict limitations in terms of time (shareholderb meeting does
not exceed eighteen months) and share available capital (purchase
may not exceed ten percent of the share capital), in most cases
fail.346
5.6.1.2. Section 71(1) Nr. 6, AktG
Exempted from these limitations is the repurchase rule under
section 71(1) Nr. 6 of the AktG.34 7 This section allows the purchase
of an unlimited amount of own stock on the basis of a
shareholderb resolution to redeem shares pursuant to the
provisions governing a reduction in share capital. The capital
reduction by redemption of shares (Kapitalherabsetzung durch
Einziehung von Aktien)m is a subdivision of the ordinary capital
reduction (Ordentliche Kapitalerh6hung).34 9 Whereas the ordinary
capital reduction decreases share capital by reducing the par value
of the shares or by consolidation shares, the capital reduction by
stock redemption results in the cancellation of individual shares
with the effect that share capital decreases by the aggregate par
value of the redeemed shares. Redemption eliminates membership
rights connected with the redeemed share, whereas the other
342 § 11, AktG.
343 §§ 60(3), 271(3), AktG.
4 See Baums & M6ler, supra note 175, at 60.
345 § 71(1) Nr. 8, AktG.
346 See Baums & M611er, supra note 175, at 60.
34 § 71(1) Nr. 6, AktG.
348 §§ 237-239, AktG.
349 §§ 222-228, AktG.
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shares remain without consequences in their legal position.3D
Unlike an ordinary capital decrease, a redemption does not by law
affect all shareholders equally, but only those whose shares are
redeemed. Therefore, the principle of equal treatment of
shareholders is not an issue.
The Stock Corporation Act distinguishes in section 237(1) of the
AktG35 between an "involuntary" mandatory stock redemption
(Zwangseinziehung) and a "voluntary" stock redemption through
acquisition by the stock corporation (Einziehung von Aktien nach
Erwerb durch die Gesellschaft). Section 71(1) Nr. 6 of the AktG serves
to prepare the voluntary alternative. 352 The repurchase relying on
section 71(1) Nr. 6 of the AktG must precede the resolution of the
shareholders' meeting concerning the capital reduction by
redemption of shares.53 This resolution requires a majority of at
least three-quarters of the share capital represented at the passing
of the resolution.34  Since in a tracking stock corporation there
exists more than one class of voting shares, the resolution requires
additional class voting with a majority of at least three-quarters of
the represented tracking stock capital in order to become
effective.355 Thus, if the management accomplishes to get the
required majorities of both all shareholders and the tracking stock
holders, the transaction can be reversed and the company exists
again only of common stock.356
5.6.2. Mandatory Redemption
The Stock Corporation Act also permits that shares may be
redeemed by mandatory redemption 5 This is the means of the
choice if repurchase of own stock is either not possible or not
desired. A mandatory redemption may, pursuant to section
350 HOFFER, supra note 145, § 237 margin no. 5.
351 § 237(1), AktG.
352 § 71(1) Nr. 6, AktG.
M Unlike the mandatory redemption, the voluntary redemption via stock
repurchase does not require any authorization in the articles. Nobody is affected
when the stockholders voluntarily contribute their shares.
354 See § 237(2)(i), AktG in conjunction with § 222(1)(i), AktG.
355 See § 237(2)(i) , AktG in conjunction with § 222(2), AktG.
356 For more details-especially regarding the pricing for the redeemed
shares-see Baums & M6ller, supra note 175, at 60-62.
35 § 237(1)(i), AktG.
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237(1)(ii) of the AktG,358 only be made if prescribed or permitted in
the original articles of incorporation or by an amendment to the
articles prior to the acquisition or subscription of the shares. Thus,
each shareholder who is joining a company knows in advance that
a mandatory redemption and, consequently, the loss of the
shareholder position, are potential threats. However, such a
mandatory redemption must not always lead to an involuntary
process. The articles can also provide that a mandatory
redemption will be triggered by the will of a particular class of
shareholders.3 9 For example, if the issuer sells the tracked assets,
the articles can provide that tracking stockholders may call for
redemption of their shares.
In the case that a mandatory redemption is prescribed by the
articles, a further resolution of the shareholders' meeting to
approve a mandatory redemption prescribed by the articles of
incorporation is not required pursuant to section 237(6)(i) of the
AktG.360 Then, with respect to applicability of the provisions
regarding an ordinary capital reduction, the decision of the
management board regarding the redemption shall be substituted
for the resolution of the shareholders' meeting.361 That means,
while voluntary redemption requires shareholder approval,
mandatory redemption is effected by the management board
invoking the appropriate provisions of the articles. This
necessitates that the articles of incorporation or the resolution of
the shareholders' meeting determines exactly the conditions
governing a mandatory redemption and the particulars of its
execution.362
6. CLOSING
Tracking stock is a unique equity-based method of structuring
and restructuring corporations that provides many of the benefits
associated with the creation of separate public equity securities like
358 § 237(1)(i), AktG.
359 HOFFER, supra note 145, § 237 margin no. 12; Baums & M6ller, supra note
175, at 6Z
360 § 237(6)(i), AktG.
31 § 237(6)(ii), AktG.
362 See § 237(2)(ii), AktG. For further details and explained drawbacks, see
Baums & M611er, supra note 175, at 62-63; Sieger & Hasselbach, Tracking Stock,
supra note 119, at 398.
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spin-offs and equity carve-outs, while preserving certain
advantages of remaining a single, consolidated entity. Among the
rewards of diversification, tracking stock has its financial
performance tied to a particular business unit, rather than the
company as a whole. It gives shareholders a "pure play" and the
opportunity to extend their investment objectives. Tracking stock
can create a distinctive M&A currency: the acquiring company
tracks the business of the target company, and the selling
shareholders keep their participation in the success and future of
their original investment Since the stock tracks the performance of
a particular business segment, companies can reward and motivate
the business unit's management by giving them equity in their
own "enterprise." It is also a great feature to measure performance
and to hold management on the board in the context of
restructures and tender offers. At the same time, tracking stock
enables issuers to retain the benefits of remaining a consolidated
entity, such as a high level of operating and management control,
retention of operating synergies that would be lost if an integrated
business becomes independent or retention of consolidated debt
capacity and existing lending arrangements.
Unique benefits are faced with unique risks. Implementing
tracking stock adds complexity to a typical company's capital
structure. Tracking stock, despite its name, remains a class of stock
in the parent company. Therefore, the targeted business retains
full exposure to the performance of the core business and to the
liabilities of the consolidated business group. The success or
failure of the whole company will inevitably influence the value of
tracking stock. Even if the tracked segment performs
tremendously well, the loss of dividends or, moreover, at a long
term basis loss of the entire investment (bankruptcy), is still
impending when the core business does not earn any profits. Not
only in terms of the distribution of dividends, but generally,
unavoidable conflicts of interest between different business
segments arise in a tracking stock culture and can literally create
decision-making nightmares for the board of directors. As a result,
agency costs might be imposed by creating conflicts of interests
over cost allocations, liquidation rights, and internal transfer
payments.
In particular, the analyses of the dependence of the tracked unit
on the outcome of the entire firm and of corporate governance in a
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tracking stock corporation lead to comparable answers. The ability
of the firm to pay dividends is, under the Delaware General
Corporation Law as well as under the presumably so strict and
inflexible German Stock Corporation Act, absolutely linked to the
outcome of the consolidated business. Under both jurisdictions the
corporation can basically distribute dividends only out of net
earnings (balance sheet profit), each calculated at the parent level
and not the business unit level.
Both Delaware and German law generally require a
corporation's board to discharge its fiduciary duties in the interests
of all of the corporation's stockholders-which may not always be
easy to do where the holders of the tracking and the ordinary
common stock may be seen as having diverging interests.
Tracking stock companies therefore need sophisticated corporate
governance guidelines. In this context this article demonstrated
that, in both jurisdictions, judicial review of resource allocations is
limited by the business judgment rule. Whereas recent Delaware
decisions suggest that there will not be any radical differences in
the availability of the business judgment rule simply because a
corporation has a tracking stock structure, due to the 1997
landmark case ARAG/Garmenbeck of the German Federal Court of
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) the business judgment rule, derived from
the American corporate law, has basically also found its way into
German jurisprudence. Although there is little developed law
dealing with these issues and thus boards need to proceed with the
appropriate caution, basically the management in both countries
can be protected against a judicial "second guessing." Thus,
management's discretion is granted insofar as the board has acted
on an informed basis, in good faith in the interest of the company,
upon due inquiry, and without self-interest in a situation involving
disparate impacts on the respective classes.
Another important issue in the corporate governance context is
to insure the rights of the shareholders against the discretion of the
management. Therefore, like Delaware law, German Corporate
Law also provides sufficient means to set forth a clear definition of
the tracked business versus the core business and to make clear
from the outset the management duties, revenue/expense
allocation, cash management, and other accounting policies to be
in effect between the tracked business and the parent's remaining
businesses. The Stock Corporation Act further enables the
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institution of committees to oversee issues affecting the interests of
tracking stock holders. Moreover, unlike the unitary American
board system, the German two-tier board system provides a
second organ, the supervisory board, to seek equilibration between
the interests of tracking stock holders and the duties of the
management board.
If, apart from implementation and restructuring, a tracking
stock culture is faced with the same problems and the same legal
resolutions in both jurisdictions, the putatively inefficient German
corporate law cannot be the whole truth of why German firms are
still reluctant to employ this financial innovation. Rather, whether
tracking stock programs will flourish in Germany, of course,
depends essentially upon how the capital market estimates the
value of this investment. Thereby it has to be taken into account
that the German capital market is still behind the development in
the United States.363 For instance, even now the German capital
market is minted through simply conservative, risk-averse
investors who prefer the relative security of savings accounts, debt
instruments with low yields, or real estate 64 Generally, the lack of
German investor experience with financial innovations could be a
factor for a higher initial discount Companies will therefore
consider very carefully why and under what conditions floating
the shares of a distinct business segment will trigger a favorable
response in the market place. In any case, the market may require
ongoing education to fully understand the interests represented by
the tracking stock, and there is always the risk that the market will
be less forgiving of the inherent limitations of tracking stock
securities in less optimistic environments.
Nonetheless, as corporations worldwide continue to seek
methods of maximizing the value of their equity, tracking stock
also seems to offer a highly attractive tool in Germany. With the
363 For statistical facts and a broad examination of European and German
securities markets and their recent growth, see John C. Coffee, Vie Future As
History: The Prospec. for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999).
364 Even though the privatization of Deutsche Telekom AG and the
establishment of the new high-tech market segment "Neuer Markt" (New Market)
have already increased the tendency to invest in stocks. For an overview about
German equity markets in English, see, for example, Andr6, Cultural Hegemony:
The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, supra
note 141, at 97-104.
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appropriate application, this innovation can also function in
Germany to unlock otherwise inaccessible value, to create a
formidable M&A currency, or management and employee
incentive programs. Maybe it is just a similar constellation to that
of GM's acquisition of EDS in 1984, which led the involved parties
to the conclusion that only the introduction of this particular tool
can accomplish the contemplated transaction, that is necessary to
launch the first tracking stock in Germany.
The signs are optimistic.365 The German stock market is
experiencing a renaissance. Shareholder value has become the
guideline principle of numerous German companies. This includes
shareholder-friendly accounting methods, stock options, and share
repurchases. The common observation is that American
investment advisors bring not only a dedication to shareholder
value and innovative financial products to the German markets,
but also an ability of the market participants and the legislator to
react quickly and alter the legal situation corresponding to
American standards. There is no doubt that legislative and court
changes that have liberalized various features of the German Stock
Corporation Act, which were increasingly influenced by the
requirements of the international capital markets,366 helped to
create an investor friendly environment. The introduction of
tracking stock could be a further step on the road to a shareholder
culture in Germany.
365 Cf. Natusch, Empirische Analysen zur Beteiligungsfinanzierung mit "Traxking
Stocks," supra note 115, at 125.
366 With respect to the liberalization debate regarding German corporate law,
see, for example, SCHNORBUS, GESrALTUNGSFREIHEIT IM UMWANDLUNGSRECHT, supra
note 239, at 131-34; Hans-Joachim Priester, supra note 239, at 187; Volker R6hricht,
Von Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsprechung, 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS-
UND GESELIScHAFrsREcHT [ZGR] 445 (1999); Harm Peter Westermann, Der
Fortschrittsgedanke im Privatrecht, 50 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 1
(1997); Harm Peter Westermann, Probleme mit der Raickbildung im Gesellschaftsrecht,
in FEsrscHRiFr FOR WOLFGANG ZOLLNER, BAND 1, 607-633 (Manfred Lieb et al. eds.,
1999).
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